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The  paper  explores  the process  of early  growth  of  entrepreneurial  science-based  ﬁrms.  Drawing  on case
studies of  British  and  Dutch  biopharmaceutical  R&D ﬁrms,  we conceptualize  the speed of  early  growth
of  science-based  ﬁrms  as  the  time  it takes  for the assembly  (or  combined  development)  of three  types
of critical  resources—a  functionally-diverse  management  team,  early  fundraising  and  development  of
technology.  The  development  of  these  resources  is  an  unfolding  and  interrelated  process,  the  causal
direction  of which  is highly  ambiguous.  We show  the variety  of  paths  used  by science-based  ﬁrms  torowth of the ﬁrm
enrose
cience-based ﬁrm
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ignal
access  and  develop  these  critical  resources.  The  picture  that  emerges  is  that  the  various  combinations  of
what  we  call  “assisted”  and  “unassisted”  paths  combine  to inﬂuence  the  speed  of ﬁrm  growth.  We  show
how  a  wide  range  of  manifestations  of technology  development  act  as signaling  devices  to attract  funding
and  management,  affecting  the  speed  of  ﬁrm  development.  We  also show  how  the  variety  of paths  and
the  speed  of  development  are inﬂuenced  by  the  national  institutional  setting.
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. Introduction
The growth of science-based ﬁrms is a key factor in discussions
n how economies commercialize and beneﬁt from the economic
mpact of science and innovation (Casper, 2007) and on the tech-
ology transfer process (DiGregorio and Shane, 2003). In particular,
he speed of growth of such ﬁrms is important given the amount
nd duration of funding required and the technological complex-
ty and uncertainty faced by these ﬁrms. Moreover, the window of
pportunity for such ﬁrms to exploit scientiﬁc and technological
iscoveries is constantly shrinking due to knowledge spillovers to
ompetitors and competition from other scientiﬁc discoveries.
This paper explores the speed of early growth of entrepreneurial
cience-based ﬁrms. Recent studies have investigated how high-
ech ﬁrms grow, adopting a variety of perspectives. For example,
tudies have explored the sequence of archetypes in venture evo-
ution from an organizational theory perspective (Ambos and
irkinshaw, 2010), the links between the competitive environ-
ent and resource management in different modes of growth from
 resource-based view (Clarysse et al., 2011), and the simulta-
eous experimentation and variety in business models from an
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 161 306 3423.
E-mail addresses: marcela.miozzo@mbs.ac.uk (M.  Miozzo),
ori.divito@mbs.ac.uk (L. DiVito).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.01.011
048-7333/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uhed  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
organizational learning perspective (Andries et al., 2013). While
these contributions have provided important insights into how
these ﬁrms grow, why  different growth patterns exist, the impor-
tance of resource conﬁgurations, and the effect of the (competitive)
environment on growth, they do not address directly the speed of
growth.
The speed of growth of new science-based ﬁrms is an interest-
ing empirical phenomenon in its own right, but particularly because
established theories of innovation management offer limited guid-
ance. Thus, its study offers an opportunity for theory development.
Both economics and management of innovation literatures have
examined speed in connection to innovation. Economics of inno-
vation scholars have explored economic growth as a process of
transformation driven by innovation, focusing on innovation pat-
terns, technological spillovers and divergence across ﬁrms and
countries (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al., 1988). The concern
with speed in this literature regards the rate at which innova-
tion is diffused throughout ﬁrms, sectors, regions and countries
(Mansﬁeld, 1961; Perez, 1983; von Tunzelmann, 1995).
For the management of innovation literature, instead, speed
refers to the rate at which discoveries are converted into rent-
producing assets, as rapid exploitation of such opportunities can
give rise to ﬁrst-mover advantages or other temporary rents.
Contributions explore the importance of decision-making speed
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Forbes, 2005); the time period between the
founder’s leaving of academia and the establishment of his/her ﬁrm
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Muller, 2010); the timing of start-up activities for different types of
ounders (Alsos and Kolvereid, 1998); the commercialization time
f patent-protected technologies by university technology transfer
fﬁces (Markman et al., 2005); and the time-to-market of innova-
ive products by ﬁrms of different characteristics, especially those
ith venture capital (Hellman and Puri, 2000; Sternitzke, 2010).
While these strands are useful in shaping our work, we  still
now relatively little about two questions: How does fast growth
f science-based ﬁrms occur? How is speed of early growth shaped
y the institutional setting? Addressing these questions calls for
ne-grained insights into the process of development of new
cience-based ﬁrms, through a comparative multiple-case study.
e  conducted 60 interviews with founders and executive man-
gers in 18 British and 17 Dutch biopharmaceutical R&D ﬁrms.
hese ﬁrms provide either R&D-intensive services, for instance,
latform technologies such as genetic sequencing, or they con-
uct R&D with the goal of developing future products such as new
herapeutic drugs or diagnostic kits. We  also draw on interviews
ith 14 supporting organizations, press releases and articles in
rade journals. From this rich data emerged an understanding of
he nature of the paths and speed of early growth of science-based
rms.
We derive four key ﬁndings. First, we conceptualize the speed
f early growth of science-based ﬁrms as the time it takes for
he assembly (or combined development) of the three types of
ritical resources—a functionally-diverse management team, early
undraising and development of technology. The development of
anagerial competence, early ﬁnance and technology is an unfol-
ing and interrelated process, the causal direction of which is highly
mbiguous. For some ﬁrms, having access to managerial compe-
ence facilitates external fundraising, and, in contrast, for other
rms, raising external ﬁnancing facilitates the recruitment of man-
gerial competence. Second, we show the variety of paths used by
cience-based ﬁrms to access and develop critical resources. The
icture that emerges is that the various combinations of what we
all “assisted” and “unassisted” paths lead to different speeds of
evelopment. Third, we show that the variety of paths (and speed)
f early growth of science-based ﬁrms is inﬂuenced by the national
nstitutional setting. We  ﬁnd a marked difference in the role of
ntermediaries, especially the support of venture capital and tech-
ology transfer ofﬁces in enabling these paths. In environments
here these are available and strong, the period of time it takes for
ounders to develop a functionally-diverse management team and
aise funds is shorter. Fourth, we show the importance of a wide
ange of manifestations of technological development that act as
ignaling devices and intervene in the early ﬁrm growth process,
aving both positive and/or negative mediating effects in attracting
oth funding and management.
We  provide next the theoretical framework. After that we
escribe the research design and data analysis. We  then present
he ﬁndings. A discussion and conclusion follow.
. Theoretical framework: Approaches to exploring the
arly growth of science-based ﬁrms
First, we explore the peculiarities of science-based ﬁrms, which
ake it necessary to single them out for a study of their early
rowth. Second, we draw on the work of Penrose (1959) and
esource-based perspective to position our approach. Third, we
xplore how the (national) institutional setting affects the access
nd development of ﬁrm resources..1. The phenomenon: Why  entrepreneurial science-based ﬁrms?
Entrepreneurial science-based ﬁrms in general (and biophar-
aceutical R&D ﬁrms in particular) have peculiarities that mayolicy 45 (2016) 964–986 965
set them apart from (other) high-tech ﬁrms in their early growth.
First, entrepreneurial science-based ﬁrms typically emerge as
research spin-offs from academic departments or industrial ﬁrms
(Mustar et al., 2006; Knockaert et al., 2011; Rasmussen et al.,
2011), and they tend to be located near universities, with which
they collaborate intensively. In the case of academic spin-offs,
the academic/scientiﬁc inventors (often the founders) are essen-
tial to the continuing success of the ﬁrm not only because
of their own scientiﬁc expertise but also because of access to
their networks of academic scientists which facilitate ﬂows of
complex technical knowledge, enabling ﬁrms to meet their tech-
nological milestones (Kenney, 1986; Liebeskind et al., 1996;
Murray, 2004; Owen-Smith and Powell, 1998; Zucker et al.,
1998).
A second peculiarity is that the R&D process in entrepreneurial
science-based ﬁrms is different from that of (other) high-tech
ﬁrms. While high-tech ﬁrms use science to develop innovation,
science-based ﬁrms are engaged in the advancement of science
itself (Autio, 1997). They not only face market, but also scien-
tiﬁc or technological uncertainty, as their main assets are R&D
projects in emergent technologies. For science-based ﬁrms, R&D
is about successively reducing uncertainty through the acquisi-
tion of information (selecting and screening), a highly iterative
and inductive process (Pisano, 2006). In (most) high-tech ven-
tures, after conception and development, there is a move to the
commercialization stage where the focus is on learning how to
make a product work well and how to produce it beyond the ﬁrst
stage prototype (Kazanjian, 1988). Science-based ﬁrms, in con-
trast, do not typically develop a prototype during the early growth
stage.
Third, science-based ﬁrms have very high capital requirements
for long term R&D. They often lack complementary capabili-
ties in clinical testing, regulatory processes, manufacturing and
distribution or marketing. They need to raise large amounts of
external ﬁnance from private investors, institutional investors or
public offerings of equity for products that take many years (typ-
ically 10–15 years in the biopharmaceutical industry) to reach
the market (if at all) and in many cases cannot rely on a pro-
gressive revenue stream. They often rely on venture capital for
fundraising.
Venture capital is not only a funding source but also a gover-
nance structure, which involves knowledgeable investors capable
of providing complementary assets to generate value. Venture cap-
ital has implications for control and may  constrain the activities
of science-based ﬁrms. It requires developed exit markets (and
therefore a suitable institutional setting). Venture capital is a gov-
ernance arrangement developed (and arguably more suitable) for
other high-tech ﬁrms, because it has a rather short exit horizon (3–5
years) compared to the long product development time required by
science-based ﬁrms (Pisano, 2006). An alternative to venture cap-
ital ﬁnancing for new science-based ﬁrms is to enter into strategic
alliances with, or acquisitions by, established ﬁrms. This alternative
may offer the funding or capabilities in clinical testing, regulatory
processes, manufacturing, distribution or marketing that they lack
(Powell et al., 1996). Early growth of science-based ﬁrms may  there-
fore be inﬂuenced by the extent to which they are positioned not
only in the “market for products”, but also in the “market for (tech-
nology) assets” as an input into the development of products by
other, more mature corporations (and including as a possible tar-
get for acquisition by these) (Colombo et al., 2010; Miozzo et al.,
2016).
There is great diversity among science-based ﬁrms
themselves. Nevertheless, the above suggests that science-
based ﬁrms face particular organizational and technological
challenges that merit an examination of their early
growth.
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.2. Penrosean-inspired approach towards the early growth of
cience-based ﬁrms
Many studies of ﬁrm growth adopt a resource-based perspec-
ive, following Penrose’s (1959) seminal contribution. We  build
n four analytical insights from Penrose’s work and contributions
nspired in her work for our analysis of growth of new science-
ased ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst insight is regarding the organizational limits to ﬁrm
rowth. In Penrose’s work, ﬁrms consist of human and non-human
esources, under administrative coordination and integration.
uman, and especially managerial, resources are the most impor-
ant, but a ﬁrm’s uniqueness derives from the distinction between
ts resources and the services that those resources can provide. Even
hough individuals may  hold critical resources, the ﬁrm’s organiza-
ional choices determine whether and how individual resources are
ranslated into organizational competence, which eventually lead
o a ﬁrm’s superior economic position (Best and Garnsey, 1999; Kor
nd Mahoney, 2004; Lockett, 2005; Nelson and Winter, 1982).
In this framework, different services are required for differ-
nt activities or stages of ﬁrm growth. For example, the type of
ntrepreneurial/managerial services needed to raise funds are dif-
erent from the type of services needed to run a ﬁrm efﬁciently.
he raising of capital depends on the entrepreneur’s (or founding
eam’s) ability to create conﬁdence, and, as ﬁrms grow, there is
ore emphasis on the “administrative integration” of the produc-
ive resources under the ﬁrm’s control (Lazonick, 2002).
Unused productive services provide excess capacity, and this
xcess capacity creates an internal mechanism for growth of the
rm, but there are managerial limits to ﬁrm expansion (Penrose,
959). In new ﬁrms, the founders are the main providers of man-
gerial services, which reside in their tacit knowledge and personal
nvestment in the ﬁrm’s ongoing viability. Bringing outside man-
gers (other than venture capital investors) to supplement the
riginal entrepreneurial team may  constitute a distraction if they
ring only general business expertise and lack ﬁrm-speciﬁc tacit
nowledge (Kroll et al., 2007). Existing managers must train new
anagers, the development and integration of whom require the
ervices of incumbent managers (Pettus, 2001). In other words,
anagerial resources with experience within the ﬁrm are nec-
ssary for the efﬁcient absorption of managers from outside.
evertheless, because the small number of incumbent managers
as limited availability, there is a constraint in the amount of expan-
ion that can be planned and undertaken in any period of time.
A second insight is the effect of uncertainty on the development
f the ﬁrm’s resources for growth. A number of contributions have
xplored the resources relevant for the growth of entrepreneurial
igh-tech ﬁrms—technological resources (speciﬁc products and
rocesses) (Clarysse et al., 2011; Mustar et al., 2006), human
esources (knowledge, skills and entrepreneurial experience of
he founder and/or founding team) (Mosakowski, 1998), social
esources (industry and ﬁnancial ties and contacts) (Khaire, 2010)
nd ﬁnancial resources (amount and type of ﬁnance) (Lee et al.,
001). In the context of science-based ﬁrms, where there is strong
ncertainty, “observable” resources can act as signals of quality for
nvestors. Patents (granted and applied) and research alliances are
rgued to attract more prominent venture capital funds or initial
ublic offering (IPO) and higher funding (Audretsch et al., 2012;
onti et al., 2013; Haussler et al., 2014). This “signaling” effect how-
ver may  diminish in sequential rounds of funding (Hoenen et al.,
014; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
The uncertainty connected to science-based ﬁrms does not only
rise from the technology, but also from the abilities of the man-
gement team. Founders’ experience in founding prior ventures
nd social network also act as signals, increasing the likelihood of
ttracting venture capital (Burton et al., 2002; Clarysse and Moray,olicy 45 (2016) 964–986
2004; Hsu, 2007). Functionally-diverse teams with management
experience and diverse prior afﬁliations have positive effects on
obtaining venture capital and going public (Beckman et al., 2007;
Certo, 2003).
A third insight is that different resources support different pro-
duction bases. Penrosean-inspired analyses argue that although
there can be a range of objective “productive opportunities” open
to the ﬁrm, their recognition is subjective (Druilhe and Garnsey,
2004) and depends on access to special knowledge. Moreover, risk
and uncertainty play a very important role, as they make the man-
agerial task more difﬁcult, requiring more skills or a greater variety
of managerial services for expansion (Penrose, 1959).
A key point is that as ﬁrms grow, they accumulate different
resources, including staff and material resources, and that the het-
erogeneity of those resources means that they can be used in
different ways. These resources can support different “production
bases” (each type of productive activity that uses machines, pro-
cesses, skills and raw materials that are complementary and closely
related) (Penrose, 1959, p. 109), associated with different techno-
logical characteristics. A move into a new base requires the ﬁrm
to build competence in a different area of technology (Penrose,
1959). The type of “productive opportunities” chosen inﬂuences
the resource requirements, including the need for new partner-
ships or collaborations to enter into new technology ﬁelds (Druilhe
and Garnsey, 2004; Garnsey and Leong, 2008).
Fourth, growth follows a non-linear, iterative process. The
movement from emergence to early growth is characterized by
the development of new resource conﬁgurations. Garnsey (1998)
shows that the early growth phase of new ﬁrms is dominated by
search activities, the initial problems centering on the perception
of opportunities and resourcing prospects. In this phase, the rela-
tions between founders and other organizations, such as former
associates and funders, are key. Access to ﬁnance is crucial at this
early stage, and convincing funders of the prospects for their ven-
ture is critical to identifying openings beyond the entrepreneurs’
immediate means. Garnsey (1998) argues that success in doing so
reﬂects institutional arrangements for investing in new ventures.
Similarly, Hite and Hesterley (2001) explore the movement of
ﬁrms from emergence to early growth and argue that, as they
transition, ﬁrms face problems of resource acquisition, including
availability, accessibility and uncertainty. They deﬁne early growth
as “the point in the ﬁrm life cycle at which a ﬁrm makes clear
strategic decisions to intentionally grow beyond mere survival, via-
bility, or sufﬁciency” (p. 277). They argue that, in the transition to
early growth, ﬁrms need to access and develop a greater scope of
resources. Also, Sirmon et al. (2011) show that resource orchestra-
tion differs in each stage of the ﬁrm life cycle. In the emergence
stage, which is characterized by experimentation in accessing
resources, managers make a substantial contribution to the ven-
ture. In early growth, overcoming early deﬁciencies becomes the
main concern, requiring the development of relations to distinctive
stakeholders such as ﬁnancers to foster growth.
To sum up, a “Penrosean”-inspired approach to examining the
early growth process of ﬁrms concludes that: (1) there are organi-
zational limits to ﬁrm growth; (2) uncertainty affects early ﬁrm
growth; (3) different types of resources support different pro-
duction bases, associated with different technologies; and (4) the
transition from emergence to growth requires a different conﬁg-
uration of resources. Nevertheless, theoretical and empirical work
on how fast growth of science-based ﬁrms occurs is still lacking.
2.3. Inﬂuence of the institutional settingMost of the contributions reviewed above are based on an exam-
ination of US ﬁrms, many of which are located in California’s Silicon
Valley. In this region, managerial labor, and the knowledge intrinsic
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not representative of the respective biopharmaceutical industries
for statistical generalization. The method of selection is based on
1 The UK is ranked as the second highest country developing biotherapies inM.  Miozzo, L. DiVito / Rese
n that labor, is highly mobile, contributing to increased knowledge
iffusion (Saxenian, 1994; Almeida and Kogut, 1999). Venture cap-
tal is also particularly abundant compared to other regions, having
merged out of the region’s base of high-tech enterprises. Venture
apitalists are unusually knowledgeable and involved with new
entures, e.g. giving advise on business plans, ﬁnding co-investors,
ecruiting managers and serving on boards of directors. The insti-
utional setting of these start-ups is unique and highly conducive
o the emergence and growth of science-based ﬁrms. We  expect
hat other institutional settings will affect differently the strategic
hoices of founders in the early growth of such ﬁrms.
Literature on comparative capitalisms (Hall and Soskice, 2001;
ollingsworth and Boyer, 1999; Whitley, 1999) explores the effects
f the institutional setting on the production strategies of ﬁrms and
he likelihood of success in different product markets (Casper and
hitley, 2004; Soskice, 1999). This literature focuses on the effect
f national institutions – the industrial relations system, the edu-
ation and training system, the ﬁnancial system, and the relations
etween organizations – which are viewed as mutually comple-
entary (Amable, 2000; Crouch et al., 2005). These institutions,
reated by the state and social processes, shape the strategic actions
f ﬁrms and the national product and technology specializations.
his approach is however at risk of presenting an oversimpliﬁed
nalysis. In particular, it downplays the possible varieties of ﬁrms’
trategies in the same institutional setting (Allen, 2006). Also, it
oes not explain why some ﬁrms may  be able to draw on “functional
quivalents” and use institutions in new ways to develop different
apabilities, and therefore follow different paths from typical ﬁrms
n the country (Herrmann, 2008; Lange, 2009). Overall, there is a
eed for a more ﬁne-grained analysis at the ﬁrm level.
There is indeed plenty of evidence that a greater range of strate-
ies are open to ﬁrms (and science-based ﬁrms in particular) within
ifferent comparative capitalisms than posited by a strict reading
f the comparative capitalisms literature. Studies on biopharma-
eutical ﬁrms in France, Finland and the UK (Mangematin et al.,
003; Luukkonen, 2005; Hopkins et al., 2013) reveal the wide spec-
rum of strategies of biopharmaceutical ﬁrms within each of these
ountries. Moreover, Herrmann (2008) and Lange (2009) showed
hat German biopharmaceutical ﬁrms increasingly follow radical
nnovation strategies by using “functional equivalents” such as
pen international labor markets or atypical contracts to compen-
ate for the lack of incentives generated by national institutions
f ﬁnance and industrial relations. It is nevertheless questionable
hether these “functional equivalents” can provide a sufﬁcient
upply of resources for the majority of German biopharmaceutical
rms (Casper, 2009).
While the comparative capitalisms literature stresses the
mportance of the institutional setting on ﬁrms’ production strate-
ies, it does not explore how the institutional setting inﬂuences
he speed of growth of early science-based ﬁrms or how and why
rms follow different paths. Our study addresses this gap in the
iterature.
. Research design and data analysis
We  designed an exploratory comparative multiple-case study of
iopharmaceutical R&D ﬁrms in the UK and the Netherlands. The
ocus on the biotechnology segment of the pharmaceutical industry
s representative of entrepreneurial science-based ﬁrms because
hese ﬁrms require extensive ﬁnancial resources for an extended
eriod of time to develop new products in emergent scientiﬁc and
echnological areas with high levels of uncertainty.
As we aim to understand how the early growth of
ntrepreneurial science-based ﬁrms unfolds and how the institu-
ional setting affects early growth, a case study is an appropriateolicy 45 (2016) 964–986 967
method for identifying the particular mechanisms of early ﬁrm
growth and evolution, including expansions and interruptions
in dynamic processes (van de Ven and Poole, 2005; Langley,
1999; Chiles et al., 2007). A comparative case study method is
appropriate for capturing data that illuminate these processes in
different organizational and institutional contexts, when multiple
levels of analysis are involved and the boundaries between units of
analysis are ambiguous (Pettigrew, 1992; Yin, 1994). We  attempt
to capture the sequences of events in time and context, paying
attention to their temporal ordering, interactions and institutional
environment (Langley, 1999; Chiles et al., 2007). Thus, we  aim to
explore what Tsoukas and Chia (2002) call “organizational becom-
ing”, that is, to explore organization as an outcome, a pattern that
is constituted, shaped and emerging from change.
Biopharmaceutical R&D ﬁrms in the UK and the Netherlands are
exemplary cases because the two countries have different institu-
tional settings, yet comparable investment and scientiﬁc output in
life sciences. In the UK, the ﬁnancial system is generally charac-
terized as having a high level of stock market capitalization and
the labor system as having a low level of employment protec-
tion. In contrast, in the Netherlands, the labor system generally
has higher employment protection, with longer-term career pat-
terns, and the ﬁnancial system has relatively lower stock market
capitalization (Gospel et al., 2014). Theoretically, in the British
context we  would expect biopharmaceutical ﬁrms to be better
able to access and mobilize risk capital to fund the ﬁrm and
mobile human resources to form the management team than in the
Netherlands. Both countries show a relatively high technological
advantage in biotechnology as deﬁned by their patent applica-
tions. Also, Heimeriks and Boschma (2014) identify Wageningen
in the Netherlands and London in the UK as the second and third
most important cities in biotechnology knowledge production in
terms of total number of publications during the period 1986-2008,
respectively, after Cambridge, USA. This suggests ﬁrms in both
countries should be able to develop the necessary technological
resources (OECD, 2009)1.
We collected data at various points in time between 2006 and
2014. To select ﬁrms, we used a minimum ﬁrm age of two years and
a minimum number of ﬁve employees (at the time of ﬁrst inter-
views in 2006). These criteria were used in order to ensure that the
new ﬁrms had achieved a level of operations that required resource
mobilization. We also selected ﬁrms according to their location, so
that one region did not become overrepresented in the study, and
aimed for a variety in origin, business models and ownership. To
aid the comparison between ﬁrms, we  sought to balance the sample
using the same criteria in the UK and the Netherlands. Unlike the
UK, most Dutch biopharmaceutical ﬁrms are privately-owned and,
as a result, three public Dutch ﬁrms were purposefully included in
the study, these ﬁrms being older and larger than the selected UK
ﬁrms.
The selection process of ﬁrms was iterative and not random. As
certain ﬁrms were added to the selection, an effort was made to
include a comparable ﬁrm from the other country. The ﬁnal selec-
tion consisted of 18 British and 17 Dutch ﬁrms (see Table 1 for
an overview of the selected cases). The selected ﬁrms are clearlyEurope per million population (after Switzerland) and the Netherlands is the fourth
(after Austria) (OECD, 2009). The UK has 4.23% and the Netherlands 0.94% respec-
tively of total venture capital investments in the life sciences of OECD countries in
2007, with 10.2% of all national venture capital going to life sciences in the UK and
9.6% in the Netherlands respectively (OECD, 2009).
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Table 1
Overview of cases.
Code Origin
of ﬁrm
Date
founded
Model at founding Summary description of
technology
Public or private
ownership (in
2006-2007)
Location Nr. of employees
in 2006–2007
Nr. of employees or
company status in
2014
UK-GGF UNIV 1996 Drug development Anti-fungal drug
development
Private MAN  10–25 10–25
UK-KRA UNIV 1997 Drug development Growth factor to protect
heart, gene therapy
Public LON >100 Dissolved in 2013
UK-NEX IND 2002 Drug development Platform for drug
interaction in ion channel
Private CAMB 10–25 50–75
UK-NGP IND 2001 Equipment Microarray screening
equipment
Private CAMB <10 Acquired in 2008
UK-OVE UNIV 1998 Drug development Drug development in
inﬂammatory and
immune diseases (tick
technology)
Public OXF <10 Dissolved in 2008
UK-PNI UNIV 1998 Hybrid Screening technology
and database for
protein-based drug
development
Private LON 25–50 Acquired in 2006
UK-RAS IND 2003 Hybrid Crystallography and
structural-based biology
platform for services and
drug development
Public CAMB 25–50 Acquired in 2008
UK-SAV UNIV 2003 Hybrid Zebra ﬁsh platfrom for
toxicity testing and drug
development
Public OXF 50–75 10–25
UK-SPE UNIV 2001 Hybrid Platform/assays to
measure stem cells
Public MAN  10–25 50–75
UK-SXD IND 2000 Diagnostic Platform to determine
the effectiveness of
cancer drug therapies
Private MAN  10–25 >100
UK-TRG UNIV 1998 Drug development Drug development for
Alzheimers
Public LOND <10 <10
UK-XCI IND 1998 Drug development Skin and repair
generation
Public MAN  75–100 Acquired in 2008
UK-XHP IND 2002 Services Services/methods for
drug delivery to the brain
Private LOND <10 10–25
UK-XOR UNIV 2004 Hybrid Drug development and
testing services for
Parkinsons
Public LOND 10–25 Acquired in 2012
UK-XOX UNIV 1999 Drug development Platform for developing
cancer, hepatisis B and
HIV vaccines
Private OXF 10–25 Acquired in 2007
UK-XSS UNIV 2001 Drug development Drug development and
testing services fro
Alheizmers
Private MAN  <10 Dissolved in 2014
UK-XTG UNIV 1997 Services Genotoxicity assays to
detect potential
cancer-causing
compounds
Private MAN  >10 10–25
UK-YLP UNIV 2001 Services Platform to use polymers
in developing new drug
products
Private LOND <10 75–100
NL-AIK IND 1997 Hybrid Drug development for
cancer
Private GRON 10–25 10–25
NL-AREK IND 1990 Services Proprietary labelling
system for DNA probes
Private AMS  25–50 10–25
NL-BRN UNIV 2003 Services Platform technology on
drug delivery to the brain
Private LEID <10 10–25
NL-EPP UNIV 1999 Hybrid Services and drug
development based on
protein technology
Private LELY 10–25 25–50
NL-HTP IND 2001 Drug development Development of known
molecules for new
indications
Private UTR <10 <10
NL-KLA IND 2005 Drug development Drug development for
inﬂammatory diseases
Private UTR <10 <10
NL-KYS IND 2004 Services Microarray for gene
proﬁling
Private AMS  <10 10–25
NL-LAG IND 1998 Hybrid Genomics platform for
services and drug
development
Public LEID >100 >100
NL-MPA IND 2000 Services Microassay products and
services
Private EIND 25–50 25–50
NL-OIB IND 2003 Hybrid Services in biology,
cellular biology and
pre-clinic
Private UTR <10 10–25
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Table  1 (Continued)
Code Origin
of ﬁrm
Date
founded
Model at founding Summary description of
technology
Public or private
ownership (in
2006-2007)
Location Nr. of employees
in 2006–2007
Nr. of employees or
company status in
2014
NL-ORP IND 2002 Drug development Drug development for
Duchenne muscular
dystrophy
Private LEID <10 75–100
NL-PMA UNIV 2002 Drug development Drug development for
infectious and
inﬂammatory diseases
Private UTR 25–50 10–25
NL-QIP UNIV 1999 Hybrid Diagnostic products and
drug development using
monoclonal antibodies
for therapeutic purposes
Private GRON 25–50 25–50
NL-RIV UNIV 2002 Drug development Outlicensing and
servicing drug
development
(prevention, treatment
and diagnosis) for a new
virus
Private ROTT <10 <10
NL-RUC UNIV 1992 Hybrid Platform technology to
genetically modify the
blood system by putting
genes into hemopoetic
stem cells
Public LEID >100 Acquired in 2011
NL-TOC UNIV 1995 Hybrid Contract research
organization; drug
development on
proprietary technology
Public LEID >100 >100
NL-VAA UNIV 2000 Services Technology that provides
parallel experimentation
at intermediate and high
throughput
Private AMS  75–100 >100
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he study’s theoretical framework and is designed to conduct a
omparative analysis of ﬁrms within and across national settings.
Data on the selected ﬁrms were collected from primary and
econdary sources. Prior to the initial semi-structured interviews,
nformation about the ﬁrms published in secondary sources (e.g.,
ebsites, annual reports, press releases, and trade press) was
athered and analyzed. This was useful in establishing timelines,
or instance on ﬁnancing, or uncovering managerial changes and
&D or product developments that could be veriﬁed and further
xplained during the initial interview. The information from the
econdary data was entered into a case study database and used to
riangulate the information gathered from interviews.
In 2006 and 2007, we held initial semi-structured interviews
ith founders and executive managers to understand the early
rowth of the ﬁrms in greater depth. Interviews were conducted
n English, at the ﬁrms’ premises, and the average length of inter-
iews was 90 min. To gather sufﬁcient detail on the founding and
nancing history, an original founder was interviewed. To reduce
etrospection bias, we alternated between open and closed ques-
ions, verifying anecdotal accounts with questions that focused on
onﬁrming facts and information gathered from secondary sources.
n the few cases where it was not possible to interview the founder,
e interviewed the longest tenured employee or external parties,
uch as accountants or investors, who were involved in the found-
ng and had historical knowledge. Through these interviews we
aptured the details of early ﬁrm formation, the events and deci-
ions taken by the entrepreneurs regarding early funding and the
hanges in management, ﬁnance and technology development.
rom the data gathered, we developed case histories to understand
he events and decisions that founders made.Between 2008 and 2014, we collected additional data and
ollowed the progress of all ﬁrms. In 2011, we  held additional
nterviews with the ﬁrms that had reached pivotal points in their
rowth (e.g. merger and acquisition or liquidation) to understandLondon; OXF = Oxford; GRON = Groningen; AMS  = Amsterdam; LEID = Leiden;
in more depth how changes unfolded after a period of growth.
These interviews were held with the same senior managers. When
the same managers were unavailable, we posed the same ques-
tions asked in the ﬁrst wave to the respondents in the second
wave to check for consistency. During this period, we continued
to collect press releases, annual reports and media coverage on
fundraising, management recruitment, R&D collaborations, clini-
cal trial progress, mergers and acquisitions, and liquidations. We
chronicled events (e.g. fundraising rounds, IPOs, R&D collabora-
tions, managerial recruitment) and augmented the case histories.
Overall, we  carried out more than 60 interviews with ﬁrm repre-
sentatives, including founders and various executive managers (e.g.
CEOs, CSOs, business development directors, and ﬁnancial direc-
tors).
In addition to the ﬁrms interviewed for the study, 14 repre-
sentatives of supporting institutions were interviewed, including
trade associations, science parks, university technology transfer
ofﬁces, venture capital investors and policymakers. These inter-
views aided in the analysis of the inﬂuence of the institutional
settings. Interviews with university technology transfer ofﬁces and
venture capital investors also served to triangulate the data gath-
ered from ﬁrms.
To conceptualize the process of early growth of these ﬁrms, we
required methods for making sense of process data. We  considered
events and interactions in their local contexts to detect mecha-
nisms leading to (or patterns of) change over time. This is in contrast
to predictive variance methods (that explore associations, or how
independent variables lead to changes in dependent variables),
more apt for simpler phenomena (Chiles et al., 2007; Langley, 1999).
Our approach was partly deductive, inspired by theory, and partly
inductive, inspired by data. This mixed approach allowed us to
develop creative insights from the data, without necessarily reject-
ing or reinventing previous concepts or categories (Denis et al.,
2001). Deductive and inductive approaches were used iteratively
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nd insights from one case generated constructs that served as a
asis for probing the process of change in others (Eisenhardt, 1989;
in, 1994). In analyzing the collected data, we used narrative and
isual mapping strategies (Langley, 1999) to represent the process
ata in a systematic way, as it allows for the identiﬁcation of key
vents and the evolution of parallel dimensions.
Drawing on Penrose (1959) and Garnsey (1998), which point to
he search activities in early growth, in particular regarding per-
eption of opportunities and resourcing prospects, we  developed
wo constructs: fundraising development (how ﬁrms are able to
ccess and mobilize the amount and type of ﬁnancial resources
hey require) and managerial development (how ﬁrms build a
unctionally-diverse management team and the industry and ﬁnan-
ial contacts they are able to leverage for this). As we  iterated
etween data and emerging logic, we gradually built a clearer char-
cterization of the process by which ﬁrms accessed and developed
ritical resources in the early stages of ﬁrm growth. We  differentiate
etween ﬁrm emergence (a stage of experimentation in obtaining
nance and the initial management team) and early growth (a stage
nvolving the strategic decision to grow beyond survival, seeking
o overcome earlier deﬁciencies through accessing and developing
ew resources) (Hite and Hesterley, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2011).
From analyzing the ﬁeld data, we identiﬁed the interrelated
rocesses that unfolded during the early growth of science-based
rms. Our inductive work went hand-in-hand with our data cod-
ng. However, in order to ground the ‘intellectual leap’ in the
ata, we considered in turn alternative explanations for differences
ound in early growth (Rerup and Feldman, 2011). These alternative
xplanations included the ﬁrms’ origin from industry or univer-
ity, their parent afﬁliation, or their national origin. We  constantly
ompared data and analysis, identifying emergent concepts and
omparing them with the relevant literature (Suddaby, 2006). We
sed cross-case comparative tabular displays to unscramble our
mpirical ﬁndings and to cluster and process our data (Miles and
Fig. 1. Visual mapolicy 45 (2016) 964–986
Huberman, 1994). As we iterated further, it became clearer that
resource development was strongly affected by the founders’ prior
ties and relationships in the emergence stage. We analyzed our
data further at the ﬁrm level to reveal the important effect of the
institutional setting on this.
Another observation emerging from the data drew our attention
inductively. This was  the importance of strong and persistent (sci-
entiﬁc) uncertainty surrounding R&D. It was at this point that we
started looking at how this inﬂuences ﬁrm emergence and early
growth. We then included a focus on how ﬁrms develop their
“production bases” (Penrose, 1959), associated with different tech-
nological characteristics into the analysis, and how this evolves
and interacts with fundraising and managerial development. From
this we found that a wide range of manifestations of technological
development had a signaling effect on the access to and develop-
ment of funding and management.
The narrative and visual mapping strategies allowed us to
identify key events and to display simultaneous dimensions
(fundraising, managerial and technological development) that
revealed precedence, parallel processes, interactions and time
duration (Langley, 1999). The visual maps present event chronolo-
gies for each ﬁrm (the horizontal time scale showing the order and
duration of events) coded in several ways (see Figs. 1–3 for exam-
ples). The location of the box in one of the three horizontal shaded
bands shows the resource domain with which the event is asso-
ciated. The arrows leading from each box indicate the inﬂuence
that one event or decision has on another. The thickness indi-
cates the impact of that inﬂuence, a thin line having low-medium
impact, and a thick line having medium-high impact. The shape of
the boxes indicates whether the event is a decision (rounded cor-
ners), an activity (square corners) or an event involving external
actors (oval). Links with the qualitative database are maintained
though short descriptions of each element in its corresponding
box.
 of UK-XOR.
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Fig. 2. Visual map  of NL-ORP.
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the categorization of the paths followed in the emergence stage2.
Appendix Tables A2 and A3 provide data supporting the categoriza-
tion of assisted and unassisted paths for fundraising and managerial
2 We do not assume that the ﬁrms followed only one path to access resources. WeFig. 3. Visua
. Findings
To conceptualize the process of early growth of science-based
rms, we focused on the interaction between the access and
evelopment of fundraising, managerial and technology resources.
ased on the evidence from the sample of 35 ﬁrms, we  uncov-
red a variety of paths that founders (or the entrepreneurial team)
ollowed to access resources in the emergence phase. We  distin-
uish between what we call “assisted” and “unassisted” paths in
rm emergence, which have an important effect on early growth.
ssisted paths refer to paths in which founders relied on their
wn or an intermediary’s relations to other organizations to access
nd mobilize critical resources. Unassisted paths refer to paths in of NL-BRN.
which founders did not have the established relations to access
critical resources. Appendix Table A1 provides an overview ofidentiﬁed and categorized the dominant path that ﬁrms followed to access critical
resources, as the dominant path has consequences that impact the further growth
of the ﬁrm. Since we are interested in how ﬁrms progress from emergence to early
growth, we  emphasize that the categorization in Appendix Table A1 represents the
paths followed during the emergence phase of the ﬁrm.
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evelopment and their associated sub-categories. Our cases also
how how a wide range of manifestations of technology develop-
ent act as signaling devices for the access and development of
undraising and managerial resources in early growth.
.1. Fundraising development
We  identify six distinct paths of how the founding team accessed
arly stage funding; four of which are assisted and two unassisted.
tarting with the assisted paths, the ﬁrst is a directly-assisted path
o funding, by which the founding scientists with prior managerial
xperience in biopharmaceutical ﬁrms accessed early stage funding
hrough their direct relations to investors. The second is a technol-
gy transfer ofﬁce (TTO)-assisted path, in which founding scientists
from university) accessed early stage ﬁnancing through the TTOs
f their university or partner institutions. This path can be seen in
he UK. The third is an indirectly-assisted path, in which founders
acked direct access to venture capital investors or established
TOs. Instead, they relied on their own personal or professional
elations to facilitate access to investors. The fourth is an early
PO path, by which founding scientists avoided venture capital and
aised early stage ﬁnancing by going directly to an IPO to maintain
ontrol. This path can be seen in four of our UK ﬁrms, as the founding
eams had the requisite managerial competence to establish con-
dence from investors and raise early stage funding successfully
rom the stock market (the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)).
We also identify two unassisted paths to access early fundrais-
ng: a revenue-generation and a grant-generation path. In more than
alf of our ﬁrms (19 ﬁrms), the founding scientists had no prior
ies to investors and had to devote considerable time to the search
or external ﬁnancing, building ties to access investors. In order to
ridge the period of time between ﬁrm emergence and the eventual
aising of funds, ﬁrms survived by generating revenue and/or grant
unding. This path can be seen in many of our Dutch ﬁrms (eight
utch and ﬁve UK ﬁrms). In the Dutch ﬁrms, although founders
aised small amounts of seed funding, they did not raise enough,
nd continued to pursue a revenue-generation path offering ser-
ices alongside more capital-intensive drug development research.
t could be argued that these Dutch ﬁrms did not raise external
nancing because they did not need it, as they followed models to
enerate revenue quickly after founding, either by selling services
r developing low-risk products with short development periods
such as equipment or devices). Nevertheless, we observe that these
utch ﬁrms continued to search for external ﬁnance from venture
apital investors as they simultaneously developed products, with
any (ﬁve out of eight Dutch ﬁrms) raising external funding after
everal years of technology development. In contrast, the UK ﬁrms
ollowing a revenue generation path had no ambitions to develop
rug products. Their technology remained at an early stage and
herefore could not attract funding for the development of new
rug products; these ﬁrms discontinued the search for external
nancing, yet continued generating revenue by offering services.
Founders also relied on peer-reviewed grants or government
unding to bridge the gap to raising their ﬁrst round of external
nancing. Both Dutch and British ﬁrms (four and two respectively)
hat relied on this path for fundraising had technology in early and
nproven stages. Grant funding from government, charitable and
ther institutions is not sufﬁcient to develop drug products through
linical trials and the ﬁrms continued to search for larger rounds of
nance.
.2. Managerial developmentWe  identify ﬁve distinct paths of how ﬁrms accessed managerial
xpertise, four assisted and one unassisted. The ﬁrst assisted path is
n investor-appointed path, in which ﬁrms, after securing externalolicy 45 (2016) 964–986
ﬁnancing, were able to tap into their investors’ networks to form
a functionally-diverse management team. The venture capital (VC)
investors appointed managerial resources and either retained or
removed one or more of the founders from the management team.
In the second assisted path, a founder-appointed path, the founders
used their own network or third parties (e.g. executive search, or
headhunters) to search for managerial resources. Founders in both
the UK and Dutch ﬁrms accessed managerial competence following
this path. Dutch founders relied primarily on third parties to recruit
management. The third assisted path, a parent-appointed path, rep-
resents ﬁrms that accessed managerial resources by appointment
from their originating institution. In most cases, but not exclu-
sively, these ﬁrms originated from university environments and
the appointments were made before raising external early stage
ﬁnance. The fourth assisted path is a founders-diversity path, in
which founding teams had functionally-diverse skills from the
outset. Founders who had previously worked together at a prior
employer were more likely to start the ﬁrm with a founding team
of complementary managerial competence. This founders-diversity
path was  evident in three UK ﬁrms.
For managerial development, there is one unassisted path, a
founders-limited path. In this path, functional diversity in the found-
ing management team is constrained as managerial resources are
not accessed in the emergence phase and founders relied on their
own  (limited) managerial competence. Founders thus assume all
the various managerial roles and responsibilities (in three UK  and
seven Dutch ﬁrms).
4.3. Technology development
Our cases show how a wide range of manifestations of tech-
nology development, including but not limited to the intermediate
outputs of inventive activity (such as patents), announcements of
partnerships or acquisitions, development of services, or success
in clinical trials, act as important signaling devices to attract early
stage fundraising and managerial resources and advance the early
growth of the ﬁrm. Establishing proof-of-concept for the technol-
ogy is a key turning point in accessing both funding and managerial
resources.
These signaling devices can have positive as well as negative
effects and the use of these signaling devices is complex. For
instance, ﬁrms can use signals of technology “failure”, such as poor
or inconclusive results from clinical trials or the discontinuation
of drug programs, as clear representations of strategic choices and
they can inﬂuence early ﬁrm growth in positive ways. Using an
example from one of our cases, UK-XCI, in anticipating a forth-
coming IPO, discontinued a drug program that used controversial
technology based on porcine xenografts. In this way, a great deal
of technological uncertainty was reduced before its IPO. Another
example is UK-OVE. Having inconclusive phase IIa clinical trial
results, it had a very difﬁcult time raising follow-on funding from
its venture capital investors. Instead, the ﬁrm turned to the public
equity market, ﬂoating on AIM, raising enough funding to continue
its drug development programs. A few years later, it reported again
poor results from clinical trials and failed to access further funding
and was  eventually liquidated.
In short, these signaling devices of technology development,
albeit positive or negative, interact with the assisted and unassisted
paths of fundraising and managerial development. The strong
uncertainty of technology development inherent in science-based
ﬁrms makes it difﬁcult to judge whether one type of path will
be more beneﬁcial than another. The resource development paths
available to science-based ﬁrms affect the subsequent strategic
choices of their managers differently and, in turn, their produc-
tion bases. In the next section, we  illustrate with three cases the
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nteraction of resource development and the effects of technology
evelopment signals on early growth.
.4. Speed of early growth
The combinations of the different paths described above inﬂu-
nce the speed of early growth. We  show below that ﬁrms can
evelop in a rapid, gradual or arrested way, contingent on the
ype of access ﬁrms have to critical resources. In this section, we
ighlight and provide narratives of three exemplary cases of ﬁrms
eveloping at different speeds.
.4.1. Rapid development
UK-XOR is an academic spin-off founded by a professor to
xploit commercially his academic department’s experimental
odels for Parkinson’s disease. The department was  entirely reliant
n grant funding and the professor wanted to secure employment
or the scientists in his department. He had tried for several years
o get his university to spin out the department. Once the univer-
ity entered a partnership with a third party to exploit university
echnology3 (more generally), his academic department was tar-
eted for spinning out:
I had a track record of working with the pharmaceutical
industry. . . I have a number of experimental models in Parkin-
son’s, which I have been using for many, many years in
conjunction with industry. . . . I had been making noises again
about trying to do something in a more commercial environ-
ment.
UK-XOR was established in 2004 and a small amount of ini-
ial seed funding was supplied by the parent organizations (the
niversity and third party). An interim CEO was appointed shortly
fter founding. We  categorized this access to managerial resources
s a parent-appointed path. The ﬁrm ﬁrst developed its manage-
ial resources, which had a signiﬁcant impact on its subsequent
ccess to funding resources. The appointment of an interim CEO
elped UK-XOR to overcome bureaucratic hurdles and aided in the
ecruitment of a CEO within the ﬁrst year. This access to managerial
esources (both the interim and permanent CEO) in the emergence
tage allowed UK-XOR to bypass venture capital investment and
aise early stage funding from an IPO. We  categorized UK-XOR’s
nancial development as following an early stage IPO path. To
ccess this funding path, UK-XOR had developed a functionally-
iverse management team within the ﬁrst year of founding to
oordinate an IPO and provide conﬁdence to investors in its techno-
ogical and commercial potential. UK-XOR listed on AIM in March
005. Following this type of path to access fundraising resources
s unusual—not only do young ﬁrms need to possess the requisite
anagerial competence but they also need to be embedded in an
nstitutional setting that facilitates early stage listing on a small-cap
tock exchange. The founding scientist described the process:
We  were off very quickly indeed singing our song around the
city to the investment managers, and to my  surprise, since we
had done nothing, [except have] a lot of ideas and a good team,
we did very well. We  offered 23 million on which we took 13.5
million at the initial placement. And got ourselves listed.
Accessing managerial and ﬁnancial resources occurred rapidly.
imultaneously with the development of ﬁnancial and manage-
ial resources, UK-XOR started a number of research programs and
ecruited another key member of the management team, the head
3 The third party partner is a UK company that partners with research-intensive
niversities to commercialize intellectual property and develop new technologies.olicy 45 (2016) 964–986 973
of drug development. The university founder became the CSO but
also retained his academic position.
UK-XOR’s technology development is fundamental to under-
standing how fundraising and managerial resources were accessed
and developed. The technology platform had strong scientiﬁc rep-
utational beneﬁts, as the academic founder had been providing
services to pharmaceuticals for many years. This production base
gave UK-XOR the opportunity to follow a hybrid business model of
offering services and developing drug products. Although both the
academic founder/CSO and the CEO believed that the immediate
revenue stream was advantageous in pursuing an early stage IPO,
both managers emphasized that offering services was  not where
the value of the company rested.
The utilization of their technology for services to pharmaceutical
ﬁrms (including regulatory approval) provided externally-focused
signals of the quality of its technology development and internally-
focused information processing beneﬁts. The CSO and CEO
expressed these beneﬁts differently. The CSO emphasized the
learning associated with the business model: “we have all this intel-
ligence that is coming in the whole time [and] we  have a very close
relationship with what [UK-XOR] does and what I do wearing my
academic hat and what big pharma wants from a small biotech.” The
CEO expressed this in terms of reducing the uncertainty inherent
in science-based ﬁrms’ research and product development:
Developing [products] in Parkinson’s has some interesting risk-
reward relations. There are many predictive models that exist
for Parkinson’s which don’t exist for almost every other indi-
cation . . . That is one of the [founding academic scientist’s]
strengths because he is so intertwined in the industry. He has
been running those models for the last 25 years for big pharma
and they run those models because they are so predictive. It’s
an FDA guideline, so what that presented to me  was nothing
that makes drug discovery any easier, it just makes it less risky
to invest more in a program. If it doesn’t work you cut it and
if it does work, you have the conﬁdence from these predictive
models that you’re going in the right direction.
The visual map  (Fig. 1) shows the progressive and rapid technol-
ogy and fundraising development that ensued. As discussed above,
within two years of founding, UK-XOR had a functionally-diverse
management team and listed on AIM. Thereafter, UK-XOR raised
subsequent rounds of funding through placements approximately
every two years as it moved drug programs through clinical tri-
als, acquired compounds for new drug programs and established a
US Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs)
for drug development with partners such as the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH), and partnerships with large Swedish and US
pharmaceutical ﬁrms. A succession of signals from its technology
development fuelled ﬁrm development, ﬁrst through outlicensing
its founding technology which also provided milestone payments
and inﬂuenced positively UK-XOR’s ability to raise more external
ﬁnancing and then through acquisition of technology which further
developed its technology resources and ﬁlled the ﬁrm’s pipeline,
again inﬂuencing positively outlicensing and collaboration agree-
ments. Eight years after its founding, UK-XOR was acquired by one
of its outlicensing partners.
4.4.2. Gradual development
NL-ORP was founded in 2002 by a scientist who had previous
work experience in Dutch and US biotechnology ﬁrms. With two
other Dutch biotech entrepreneurs, NL-ORP began with an “idea
to use particular technology on nucleic acids, nucleotides . . . and
started this with a little bit of money.” In the emergence stage, NL-
ORP accessed ﬁnancial resources through a grant-generation path,
drawing on grants from government schemes to stimulate biotech
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three years of NL-BRN’s development using government grants and
relying on university resources, developing the production base—a
platform technology on drug delivery to the brain that could be
4 The technology development trajectory of NL-ORP can be contrasted with two
other ﬁrms in our sample, UK-XCI and UK-OVE. These two ﬁrms also reported nega-
tive  clinic trial results and as a result these two ﬁrms had great difﬁculty in securing
ﬁnancial resources subsequent to this signal of technology failure. Both ﬁrms were74 M. Miozzo, L. DiVito / Rese
ntrepreneurship and later on grants from patient organizations
or ﬁve years.
The core technology of NL-ORP emerged from the founder’s con-
iction that “to survive we had to develop a therapeutic product
ut of the technology”. He further explained that they came across
echnology from a nearby university that “was using our type of
olecules to develop a therapy for Duchenne disease”. It was a
echnology for gene expression that allowed for correction of a
utation, a “molecular band-aid . . . you can mask the mutation
nd then you can correct it”. That technology became the core of
L-ORP’s production base and “was patented together with our
nowledge of the compounds to do the masking of the mutation”.
rom that point, NL-ORP started to change from a “technology to
 product development mindset. We  started slowly but surely to
evelop as a product development company . . . That changed the
ompany.”
Once NL-ORP had identiﬁed their technology focus and produc-
ion base, they ﬁled for and received orphan drug development
tatus, which acted as a positive signal of technology development
s now they could fast track the clinical trials associated with drug
evelopment for Duchenne. This occurred three years after found-
ng. The orphan indication also allowed NL-ORP to access more
rant-generated funding from patient organizations:
We didn’t have a big pot of money . . . so I had to go out and
get grant money and then at a certain point we  had some good
results and I was able to attract some small amounts [of funding]
and then I got grants again . . . and we built on that. We  were
able to attract a lot of grant money.
The founder estimated that in the ﬁrst ﬁve years, he received a
total of 6 [government] grants and about 3 to 4 grants from patient
rganizations. That amounts to . . . between six or seven million
uros.”
A question that arises is why the founder of NL-ORP used grant-
eneration to raise funding instead of pursuing a path of venture
apital investment. An explanation is that NL-ORP had still not
stablished technological proof-of-concept and it was not until
fter the results of pre-clinical trials that venture capital was  raised.
n 2007, ﬁve years after its founding, NL-ORP raised D 13.5 million
n its ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing from a local venture capital fund. The
ounder explained that he tried to ﬁnd VC investment earlier and
pproached both local and international investors:
At ﬁrst I did call up the larger ones and they said ‘nice, but you’re
too small’. I didn’t pursue that any further because when two
of them already say that you’re too small, that’s ﬁne. But now
[2007] it is a little bit different because we are in the clinic,
we are a little bit bigger, new technology, so that they ﬁnd us
interesting . . .
Access and development of managerial resources progressed
radually as well. From the very start, the founder assembled an
dvisory board with two experienced biotechnology scientists and
ntrepreneurs. The founder referred to how the lack of funding
nﬂuenced the development of managerial resources: “We  didn’t
ave a big pot of money to bring in management.” Coinciding with
he venture capital investment in 2007, the founder searched for
nd recruited staff for key posts, including scientiﬁc director, head
f clinical development, head of research, ﬁnancial director, busi-
ess development and regulatory affairs:
. . . because of my  experience, knowing that you have to put up
a quality system to do this before you can enter into human
trials, these guys. . . came in with their particular expertise in
product development, we could cut a lot of the time needed
for a young company to set itself up as qualiﬁed to do clinical
trials.olicy 45 (2016) 964–986
Thus, managerial development in NL-ORP occurred primarily
through a founder-appointed path. Shortly after the second round of
venture capital ﬁnancing, approximately seven years after founding
in 2009, the founder CEO was replaced.
With advances in technological development (see Fig. 2), man-
agerial and fundraising resource development followed. There
were subsequent rounds of ﬁnancing, along with outlicensing rev-
enue, milestone payments and royalty fees. NL-ORP continued to
raise funding through various European grant programs and char-
ities or patient organizations. NL-ORP entered several different
alliances, including partnerships with universities (Dutch as well
as other European and US universities), hospitals and large phar-
maceutical companies, to develop its drug development programs.
It successfully progressed its drug programs through several phases
of clinical trials. In 2011, NL-ORP received US and Japanese patents,
strengthening its technology position. In 2012 and 2013, NL-ORP
received ﬁve different awards of recognition (e.g. Emerging Star
Award). In January 2013, the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) awarded NL-ORP orphan drug status on its entire portfolio
of Duchenne products. In July 2013, eleven years after its founding,
NL-ORP listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange, issuing 6.9 million
shares and raising D 64 million. In September 2013, NL-ORP and
its large pharmaceutical partner announced that one of its ﬂag-
ship programs failed to meet Phase III clinical trial endpoints, a
signal of technology failure. Indeed, NL-ORP’s stock market value
dropped dramatically, its share price losing two-thirds of its value
in just one day in September 2013, with more than 17 million shares
traded. Up until March 2014, NL-ORP made various announcements
regarding this program. One signiﬁcant signal, in January 2014,
was the announcement that it would regain the full rights to the
program and terminate its collaboration with the large pharmaceu-
tical company. In May  2014, NL-ORP announced they would pursue
clinical development with a re-dosing plan, stating that, “treating
earlier in the disease and treating for a longer duration confers a
treatment beneﬁt”4.
4.4.3. Arrested development
NL-BRN is an example of arrested development, as it was  able
to survive but experienced a stagnant development, neither raising
early ﬁnancial resources nor recruiting a functionally-diverse man-
agement team. Arrested development combines unassisted paths
of both ﬁnancial and managerial development over an extended
period of time, depending on university resources or grant funding
for long periods of time.
NL-BRN was founded by a post-doc interested in exploiting the
research he did in his PhD. The university was in the process of out-
licensing the technology developed over the course of his doctoral
work and was involved in technology transfer negotiations. At this
point, he began discussing the possibility of starting up a biotech
ﬁrm, ultimately agreeing that one part of the technology would be
licensed and that he would start a company with the other. In 2000,
the university hired the founder for six months while he applied for
and received a government grant for start-ups. He funded the ﬁrstalso listed on the AIM stock exchange and eventually liquated their assets by either
ﬁling for bankruptcy or selling their technological assets. NL-ORP has withstood this
negative technology signal because of the many other positive signals over the long
duration of time. With sufﬁcient funds and an experienced and functionally-diverse
management team, NL-ORP still continued its technology development.
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Table 2
Paths to fundraising and managerial development and speed of early growth.
Paths to managerial development
Assisted Unassisted
Paths to fundraising
development
Assisted Rapid
development
Gradual
development
Unassisted Gradual Arrested
Our study also contributes to the literature on comparative cap-M.  Miozzo, L. DiVito / Rese
atented and developed commercially. NL-BRN was legally estab-
ished three years later in 2003.
The founder was aware that by the end of the grant period
hey “needed to have investors . . . so we validated the technol-
gy and got a term sheet from one of the biotech companies that
hey were willing to have an option agreement with the technol-
gy that we were developing.” It took NL-BRN eight years from the
nitial grant funding to raise a ﬁrst round of venture capital ﬁnan-
ing (D 4 million) in 2008. We  categorized NL-BRN as following a
rant-generation path to access ﬁnancial resources.
The development of managerial resources in NL-BRN was  also
imited. Grant funding began before the ﬁrm was  legally estab-
ished. At that point, only the founding scientist and a lab technician
ere working on developing the technology. The founder reﬂected
ritically on the way NL-BRN started:
There was nothing and we really needed that grant money to get
a patent out of it. There was really nothing. Normally a company
would [start] at the phase were we are now . . . that would be
more logical. There is a patent and you have some validation.
That is where we are about now [2007]. But . . . I wanted to start
a company without any IP. I did it the hard way. I wouldn’t do it
again in this way. Too many risks . . .
The founder had, at that emergence stage, sought external
dvice and support during negotiations from a consultant who had
harmaceutical manufacturing experience. This developed into a
loser collaboration, and the consultant became an equity part-
er when the ﬁrm was legally established. The founder also had
n academic partner, a professor who was a scientiﬁc advisor.
s a result of generating grants to support technology develop-
ent, NL-BRN also had four technicians working on the technology
hrough a university arrangement and had a formal agreement
hat the knowledge would be for commercial use. In its emer-
ence stage, NL-BRN used university facilities, paying bench fees
nd collaborating closely with university researchers, described by
he interviewee as a “continuous ﬂow of knowledge”.
In this emergence stage, managerial resource development was
imited,  consisting only of the founding (equity) partners and advi-
ory board members. The founding partners divided managerial
esponsibilities and roles between the two of them, one assuming
cientiﬁc responsibility, the other general administration and busi-
ess development. Recruitment of key managerial positions took
lace only after venture capital funding was raised eight years later.
In parallel, the technology development of NL-BRN also expe-
ienced slow progress. When they started, their ambition was  to
e a “target-discovery company”. The founder explained how they
ettled on their technology:
. . .we couldn’t do much about the scientiﬁc plan [looking for
targets] because that was what we got the [grant] money for
and we needed to do that to get into an IP position. One of the
targets was luckily very close to application and we  could get a
good patent position on that. It was based on drug delivery so
. . . we were looking for therapeutic targets but the target we
found we could just use for drug delivery . . . [however] when
[the technology was developed] enough to go to investors that
market was very dried up.
Leading up to its ﬁrst round of venture capital in 2008, NL-BRN
acked signals of technology development, which severely impeded
he growth of NL-BRN and impacted its strategic choices. Even
hough NL-BRN had patented technology, which sends a positive
ignal, it could not generate interest in the technology opportunity,
ttracting neither venture capital nor collaborative partnerships
ith biotech and pharmaceutical companies for a long time. The
ounder realized that progress was slow but acknowledged the
earning process: “. . . the science is mostly paid by research grants.development development
But . . . it is too slow. We  have learned a lot . . . now we know what
to do”.
NL-BRN experienced a turning point in 2008. After raising
its ﬁrst round of venture capital, it in-licensed technology from
a research institute in Taiwan, negotiating exclusive worldwide
rights of use. With the help of the VC investor, the ﬁrm recruited
a CEO in 2009 who  had commercial and business development
experience in a large US biotechnology ﬁrm. Yet, even with these
positive signals of technology and managerial development, the
development of additional ﬁnancial resources progressed slowly.
It took another three years to raise an additional D 7 million. The
recruitment of managerial resources also progressed slowly. In
2014, NL-BRN recruited a senior-level CFO from one of the largest
Dutch biotech ﬁrms. Although the (local) ﬁnancial and trade media
report on NL-BRN’s business and technology, NL-BRN still lacks
technology signals that encourage a speedier ﬁrm development.
5. Discussion
Our study builds on and extends the contributions of Penrose
(1959) and Garnsey (1998) on ﬁrm growth. It shows the speed
of early growth of science-based ﬁrms as the time it takes for
the assembly (or combined development) of the three types of
critical resources—a functionally-diverse management team, early
fundraising and development of technology.
A ﬁrst issue raised by our ﬁndings is that the development of
early ﬁnance, managerial competence and technology is an unfol-
ding and interrelated process, the causal direction of which is highly
ambiguous. For some ﬁrms, having access to managerial compe-
tence facilitates external fundraising, and, in contrast, for other
ﬁrms, raising external ﬁnancing facilitates the recruitment of man-
agerial competence. Different studies have used different indicators
(e.g., number of employees, funds invested, market capitaliza-
tion) for exploring organizational growth. Our  process analysis has
enabled us to take what are usually viewed as outcomes and to
consider them explicitly as inputs (management team as input to
funding, funding as input to developing a management team). For
example, rounds of funding can be regarded not as a measure of per-
formance but as an input that can persuade experienced managers
to join the ﬁrm.
We  show the variety of paths used by science-based ﬁrms to
access and develop critical resources. The combination of these
paths explains how ﬁrm growth can unfold in a relative straight-
forward and rapid way, in a more gradual way (when development
is in small steps and represents impeded access to either ﬁnance
or managerial resources), or can even be arrested (when ﬁrms are
unable to develop a full functionally-diverse management team and
have limited access to early ﬁnance). Table 2 shows the paths to
fundraising development and managerial development. The basic
picture that emerges is that the various combinations of assisted
and unassisted paths lead to different speeds of development.italisms (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1999;
Whitley, 1999), by showing that the variety of paths (and speed)
of early growth of science-based ﬁrms are clearly inﬂuenced by
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he (national) institutional setting. We  ﬁnd a marked difference in
he role of intermediaries, especially the support of VC and TTOs
n enabling these paths. In environments where these are available
nd strong, the period of time it takes for founders to develop a
unctionally-diverse management team and raise funds is shorter.
or all of the sampled UK ﬁrms originating from universities, the
TO from their university or partner university aided in their emer-
ence, providing systematic assistance in accessing seed ﬁnancing
nd managerial competence. The TTO facilitated access to venture
apital investors, who in turn appointed managerial resources, or
he TTO appointed a CEO to run the venture, which in turn raised
he necessary ﬁnance for ﬁrm development. Once the ﬁrm recruited
nvestors, they generally removed one (or more) academic founders
rom the management team; nevertheless, academic founders
emained strongly involved in non-executive or advisory roles or
s CSOs. In the UK ﬁrms, academic founders combined their early
anagement roles with their academic positions and the ﬁrms
aintained the links to the academics’ knowledge and networks.
n contrast, in our Dutch ﬁrms, assisted paths via intermediaries
uch as TTOs played a less signiﬁcant role in early fundraising. In
act, the Dutch ﬁrms categorized as having a rapid development
id not originate from university environments. Where TTOs were
nvolved in the emergence of Dutch ﬁrms, Dutch academic founders
ad limited or no involvement in the ﬁrm founding or further devel-
pment. Dutch TTOs appointed external managerial resources in
he early stage. In cases where academic founders played a key role
n the ﬁrm founding, they received no TTO assistance and followed
unassisted” paths to access early stage resources.
Also, one of the fundraising paths that UK ﬁrms followed was  to
ypass VC/private equity funding and raise ﬁnance by an early stage
PO on the AIM stock exchange. Having a small capital stock market,
he UK ﬁnancial system offered entrepreneurs this avenue to devel-
ping ﬁnancial resources and provided an exit strategy for angel or
enture capital from the beginning (although UK biopharmaceuti-
al ﬁrms have adapted to recent constraints on the stock market, see
opkins et al., 2013). Also, in the UK, seed investment is protected
hrough the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS). In contrast, the
utch ﬁnancial system has less liquidity on the small capital stock
arket and a labor system with less mobility of managerial and sci-
ntiﬁc labor, and less support from specialized services. A lack of
anagerial competence in the early stage may  explain why Dutch
rms were unlikely to follow the early stage IPO funding path.
The lack of assisted paths in fundraising also has consequences
n developing managerial competence. Without the facilitation of
ediators, Dutch founders, especially academic founders in our
ample, followed primarily unassisted paths in accessing manage-
ial resources, requiring founders to leave their academic positions
o commit fully to the ﬁrm and increase its credibility. A gradual
evelopment represents impeded access to early stage ﬁnancing;
et ﬁrms were able to access managerial resources, which, in turn,
llows ﬁrms to develop capabilities and technology development
ignals to raise funding. As shown in Table 2, the combination
f one assisted and one unassisted path of early fundraising and
evelopment of managerial competence lead to a gradual ﬁrm
evelopment.
As argued above, having access to managerial resources pro-
ides new ventures with funding alternatives that are also rooted in
nstitutional differences. In the UK, the ﬁrms that were able to raise
unding from early stage IPOs and bypass venture capital investors
ad the managerial resources to coordinate an IPO. This is a ﬁnd-
ng that is not exposed enough in the literature on early funding of
ntrepreneurial ﬁrms.In contrast, Dutch ﬁrms are hindered from following this path
ot only due to the lack of a small capital stock exchange but
lso the lack of intermediaries to facilitate access to the requisite
anagerial resources to coordinate an IPO. In the Dutch context,olicy 45 (2016) 964–986
which also lacked domestic venture capital investors, the ﬁrms
we studied accessed international venture capital and corporate
venture capital, investors that do not typically provide the bro-
kering or mediation role needed to access managerial resources.
Nevertheless, once ﬁrms had secured international investment and
gained legitimacy, they were able to recruit managerial resources
through other types of local intermediaries (e.g. recruitment
agencies).
Thus, in our Dutch cases, while ﬁrms can compensate for con-
straints on ﬁnancial resources by using “functional equivalents”,
such as international sources of venture capital, access to man-
agerial resources appears more limited by national or regional
boundaries and labor regulations, making functional equivalents
more difﬁcult to access and use (Casper and Matraves, 2003;
Herrmann, 2008; Lange, 2009). The Netherlands faces shortages
of graduates in science and engineering (OECD, 2004) and has a
less mobile pool of managerial labor for science-based ﬁrms. This
contrasts with the UK, where the existence of clusters around
respected universities conducting research in the life sciences
appears to facilitate managerial development. Here, the availability
of knowledgeable and relatively mobile managers with experi-
ence in biotech and pharmaceutical ﬁrms and also an additional
network of private equity and specialized services (e.g. lawyers
specializing in intellectual property) provides both a labor pool and
support services for the development of new science-based ﬁrms.
The combination generates a ‘recycling mechanism’ (or safety net)
for scientists and engineers if ﬁrms fail given the scientiﬁc and
commercial uncertainty.
By raising early stage external ﬁnance, the Dutch ﬁrms stud-
ied had not only the ﬁnancial resources but also legitimacy and
credibility to offer executives from international labor markets
incentives attractive enough to persuade them to join the ﬁrm.
Also, Dutch ﬁrms more than British ﬁrms followed hybrid busi-
ness models that combined service provision with drug discovery
and development to compensate for the lack of early ﬁnancing
institutions and managerial competence (DiVito, 2012). This more
obstructed access to and development of critical resources led to
ﬁrm development that was  more gradual. Indeed, this echoes other
studies showing the positive impact of government ﬁnancial sup-
port to R&D of existing ﬁrms on local biotech ﬁrm birth (Kolympiris
et al., 2014).
The combination of unassisted paths to access both ﬁnancial and
managerial resources resulted in cases of arrested growth (Table 2).
In our Dutch cases, the founders lacked ties (via TTOs or other-
wise) to access ﬁnancial and managerial resources and were often
dependent on the facilities of universities. Without the mediation
of investors or TTOs, the founders were obliged to assume the
various roles of a management team. Again, without these inter-
mediaries, the (limited) managerial teams of these ﬁrms remained
unchanged for prolonged periods of time, resulting in arrested
development.
A second issue raised by our ﬁndings is the importance of a wide
range of manifestations of technological development that act as
signaling devices and intervene in the early ﬁrm growth process
(Haussler et al., 2014; Hoenig and Henkel, 2015), having both pos-
itive and/or negative mediating effects in attracting both funding
and management. Our research shows that these signals go beyond
the role of patents and alliances acknowledged in earlier literature
to include clinical trials, proof of concept, licensing, acquisitions
and provision of services. We  show that these signals play not only
an important role in attracting early funding (as acknowledge by
the literature) but also in attracting managers to develop the man-
agement team. This is because of the high degree of iteration in
R&D in science-based ﬁrms; each of these signals contributes to
reducing the uncertainty surrounding R&D and improving expec-
tations about future returns, affecting the expansion plans and
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ime structure. These signals may  contribute to alleviating infor-
ation asymmetries between entrepreneurs and funders and
ew managers respectively, in the context of long research and
roduct development cycles and uncertain scientiﬁc and com-
ercial outcomes, which makes these signals useful (Pisano,
006).
Our research is in line with Tylecote and Visintin (2007) who
uggest that the visibility of (potential) innovation may  affect the
eadiness to invest by ﬁnanciers. We  contribute to this line of
esearch by showing that these signals can be interpreted as a
ay to make the (highly uncertain) R&D process of science-based
rms more visible to outsiders in a context of high technological
pportunities (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996) to attract and develop
ritical resources. Thus, visibility may  not be limited to the highly
ormalized and regulated process of R&D and protection afforded by
atents (which may  take many years to materialize), but includes
 host of other signals at a more early stage of ﬁrm development.
lthough these signals may  not be entirely reliable, as ﬁrms may
ave different standards in advancing drugs from one stage to
he next in clinical trials (Pisano, 2006), our research shows that
hese signals contribute to attracting ﬁnance as well as managerial
esources (both national and international) to form a functionally-
iverse management team.
Our work thus points to the important inﬂuences of the institu-
ional setting on the speed of growth. The literature on comparative
apitalisms (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hollingsworth and Boyer,
999; Whitley, 1999) emphasizes the effect of the incentive struc-
ure provided by the network of interactions among national
nstitutions on the production strategies of ﬁrms, ultimately inﬂu-
ncing and shaping the technological specialization of ﬁrms and
hat of countries (for example, by suggesting that certain countries
ave institutional settings more favorable to sectors characterized
y radical innovation and others by incremental innovation). While
t is argued that resources available to ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by the
rientation of the ﬁnancial system, industrial relations, educational
nstitutions and that these institutions will support or hinder efforts
y ﬁrms to develop organizational and technological capabilities in
ifferent product markets, there is relatively little research on the
echanisms through which these institutional variables inﬂuence
he development of newly-established ﬁrms. Our research builds
n this stream of literature and shows how and why  these insti-
utions inﬂuence the development of science-based ﬁrms in early
rowth, particularly the speed with which ﬁrms can assemble their
ritical resources.
Our ﬁndings raise important implications for policy. We  show
he importance of a range of factors (and interactions) in early
rm development, including the ability to use the science knowl-
dge base, institutions of ﬁnance, professional careers and mobility
f R&D and technical management personnel, role of bridg-
ng institutions, and university-industry relations. Policymakers
eed to be aware of the alternative paths followed by science-
ased ﬁrms in their national economies and develop policies
hat stimulate their growth, for example, by encouraging the
se of international venture capital as a form of early stage
nancing.
Our work also supports the need for schemes that facili-
ate the development of networks, connections and mentoring of
ntrepreneurial science-based ﬁrms through relations with both
stablished ﬁrms and universities. Moreover, the creation of ini-
iatives that promote ‘protected’, rather than precarious, forms of
mployment mobility and the transfer of managerial skills and
nowledge and international recruitment of executives in the
cience-based area would support the early growth of such ﬁrms.
olicymakers also need to reconsider their policies on academic
pin-offs and technology transfer. The challenges that academic
ounders face need to be addressed by effective policies to engageolicy 45 (2016) 964–986 977
industry-experienced professionals through various means (e.g.
building ties through collaboration with ﬁrms) and strengthening
the capabilities and efﬁcacy of TTOs in the development and growth
of new ﬁrms originating from university.
Our ﬁndings also suggest implications for science-based
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs need to be aware that many
manifestations of their technology development (beyond the
acknowledged role of patents and alliances) can act as signaling
devices to attract investors and management. This is particularly
important in the context of long development cycles, scientiﬁc
uncertainty and strict regulatory regimes, which make the devel-
opment of a track record or the conveying of quality otherwise
difﬁcult. This means that ﬁrms may  not only trade off the post-
ponement of patents (to maximize the years of legal protection)
against earlier patenting for signaling effect (Hsu and Ziedonis,
2013) but may  also approach other signaling devices in a simi-
lar way  (e.g. announcement of technology licensing or dropping
controversial projects when it is necessary to attract capital and
management). The timing of patents is a complex issue, as ven-
ture capital investors have a tendency to invest in ﬁrms with
pending patent applications (Baum and Silverman, 2004) but
long development trajectories favor later patent applications for
full exploitation of rents. Also, as Haussler et al. (2014) show,
information generated in the course of the patenting process
affects the ﬁnancing decision dynamically, long before a patent is
granted.
6. Conclusion
Understanding the early growth phase of entrepreneurial
science-based ﬁrms is an important question for practitioners
and policymakers. Many countries invest heavily in sustaining a
strong and healthy science base, but face challenges in the abil-
ity to commercialize and beneﬁt from the economic impact of
science. This paper examines the early growth phase of science-
based ﬁrms through a study of biopharmaceutical ﬁrms in the UK
and the Netherlands. Our research brings to light the variety of
paths of early fundraising, managerial and technological develop-
ment. We distinguish between “assisted” and “unassisted” paths
for ﬁrm emergence and how these paths combine to inﬂuence the
speed of ﬁrm development. A range of manifestations of technol-
ogy development can act as signaling devices to attract funding
and management. We  show how the variety of paths and the
speed of ﬁrm development are inﬂuenced by the national insti-
tutional setting. This study contributes to conceptual discussions
of entrepreneurial science-based ﬁrm early growth and has impor-
tant policy and practitioner implications. It also unveils questions
for future research, in particular, how different paths of early
growth affect subsequent growth and outcomes in later develop-
ment stages of science-based ﬁrms.
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Table A1
Overview of paths followed in ﬁrm emergence stage.
Table A2
Data supporting categorization of paths to fundraising development.
Type of path Firm (year founded) Data supporting path followed to fundraising development during ﬁrm
emergence
Year of 1st round of
fundraisingi
Assisted
Directly-assisted (VC) UK-NEX (2002) “We  didn’t need to [search for funding] because all this sort of came together.
The  [VC] wanted to do ion channels; these guys were around; I was around; so
it all just came together.”
“. . . a group of people came together at the same time and that is how things
got started. . . They knew the guys we know.  . .it was not like looking for a
needle in a haystack. If you want to do something and you got the right people
to  talk to, then it turns out to be a fairly efﬁcient [process]”
2002
UK-XCI (1998) “During a dinner with two  old friends, I mentioned that I wanted to return to
the  UK and my  friend [who was  a VC] said, start a business and I’ll fund it.”
“I  had known the VC now for years and I’ve known, the other investor [CVC]
for over a period of time. It wasn’t cold calling. From their actual ﬁrm
commitment to closing, it was 2 months.”
1999
NL-HTP (2001) “[The founder] brought these three [investors] together and said I have a good
idea to start a company and you three should at least initially come up with
some money.”
“We  started with 4 or 5 projects [that the founder had] . . .on January 1st, 2001
with these three business angels.”
2001
NL-VAA (2000) “We  are a spin out of . . . a mix  of petrochemical pharmaceutical companies
and three technology universities. [The founder] managed to convince [them]
that it had a better chance to ﬂourish outside of [the parent company] and that
[they] could still beneﬁt from it by investing. . . . He managed to attract quite a
few companies [CVC], both initially and in the consecutive ﬁnancing rounds.”
“We  were founded in Feb 2000 ofﬁcially . . . not too long after that, VCs came
on  board.”
2002
NL-PMA (originally 2000;
re-established in 2002 after a
merger)
“It is not the ﬁrst company I founded . . . then they know you personally and
they say, well, if you invest, we  invest as well . . . When it started in 2000. . .
there were other VCs that were willing to invest along with [lead investor] . . .
then  biotech deteriorated and we  were not able to close the deals with the
other VCs . . . So we were stuck with one VC which was not the original plan.”
“.  . . with that [seed] money you start the contract, you start the subsidy, you
have it and then you go to the VC . . . then we had the ﬁrst round, then the
merger and then later on [more rounds].”
2001
NL-LAG (1998) “. . . So we spun it out, ﬁrst as a 50/50 joint venture. [And then we had to make
a  decision], dilute our 50% stake by allowing VCs in or not. . . . we attracted a
group of VCs . . . to get external funding . . .”
2002
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TTO-assisted (VC) UK-OVE (1998) “The very early ﬁnancing was from high net-worth individuals through the
university network who  put in a matter of a few hundred thousand. . . . the ﬁrst
major round was  something like 2 million. . .,  and that was put in by [VC] plus a
few of these high net worth individuals.
“[VC] made their investment in 2001”
“. . . in April 2004, we were pretty well out of money, . . . and it had proved very
challenging to raise VC money so we ﬂoated or died.” [Floated in August 2004]
2001
UK-XOX (1999) “we were put in touch with the head of department [who] personally knew [the
VC].  . .he had been through that process of ﬁnancing and spinning out
companies”
”We  received 1.1 million pounds as [an initial] investment. That is what we
started with on day one.” (1999)
1999
UK-PNI (1998) “. . . there were a bunch of angel investors at [university]. They had a VC arm, a
set of high net worth individuals who were looking for spin outs from the
university. . . . It was an informal network . . . a bunch of people connected
through [university] and [they] had some cash and were doing investments.”
“Fairly quickly it transitioned to being an independent stand-alone company and
the shareholders from the [university] got diluted over time as further
investment came into the company.”
1999
UK-YLP (2001) “[The TTO from another university] had more ability to get the company formed
and the infrastructure. They have been very helpful and they were very useful in
navigating through the process.
“We  went to the Wellcome Trust and BioSeed Fund and ﬁnally [got] the seed
money, which was 2001 or 2002. Basically, 750,000 pounds to start. [The TTO]
had also put some money in . . .”
“[We formed the company [in 2001] and then we  did the seed investment.”
–
Indirectly-assisted (VC) NL-AREK (1990) “We  found a business angel. By our own private network. . . . [The business
angel] was  the ﬁrst to start with and then after two  years we found another
investor which was initially a customer of ours, a distributor . . . He took shares
and invested in the company and later on we found a private investor from
South Africa.”
“. . . [the informal investors, high net worth type of individuals] was for the ﬁrst
six years and then in 1999 we get our ﬁrst institutional investor . . .”
1999
UK-KRA (1997) “. . . the TTO at my  university was  not very good. . . . through private contacts I
got in touch with a venture capital company . . .”
1998
Early stage IPO UK-TRG (1998) “The [inventors] brought the idea to people who had money in [the UK] to get
the whole project off the ground and part of those founders did get rewarded
with shares when it was  initially set up. [UK-TRG] was a company set up to
acquire the [inventor] companies and then, when it was ﬂoated, shares were
issued to the people who had been there at the beginning.”
“We  went on to OFX [Open Financial Exchange] in 1998. . . . Then a bit of money
at the end of 1999 just to keep it going until we ﬂoated on AIM in March 2000
and raised 5 million pounds.”
2000
UK-XOR (2004) “. . . there is always this worry about dilution going to VC and wanting both arms
and both legs and before you look around you don’t own the company anymore.
I  think one of the reasons for doing it the other way [ﬂoating] was to sell off a
portion of the company but retain control. To ﬂoat, I think that largely came
from [the CEO].”
“It was  a bit of a surprise to me that we  [ﬂoated] so fast. . . . it did come around
very rapidly considering that we hadn’t done anything. We had just ideas and
people and that is what we  sold them [the investors].”
2005
UK-SAV (2003) “I’ve made some money out of [prior venture]. So now I don’t need any business
angels. I can be one to myself. There was only two  or three people in the
company and we were in the university lab but we managed to persuade a set of
investors that we were worth 35 million pounds and they put in 15 million on
top  of that.”
“Listed on AIM and then we had 10 million in the bank, so off we went. It took us
a  day and 1/2 to raise the 15 million. I didn’t have to go further in London.”
2004
UK-RAS (2003) “We  had four or ﬁve ways of funding the company . . . controlling the company
was big . . . we didn’t want to give away the whole company . . . we didn’t want
[poor investors] involved with the company . . . we didn’t have any conﬁdence in
mergers and acquisitions . . . we  went down the AIM route . . . our objective was
always to ﬂoat on AIM very quickly”
“. . . we  founded and then really spent nine months just getting some money
together . . .”
2004
Unassisted
Revenue-generation NL-QIP (originally 1992;
re-established in 1999)
“. . . the science park foundation invested . . . then [a bank] put in some money as
well in 93. Then [a seed fund] was the ﬁrst investment . . . We  had a little bit
more space to develop but it was not a serious ﬁnancing round.  . .We  have sold
quite some products . . .”
“We  were ready with a ﬁnancing round in 2001 or 2002 . . . it was  a combination
with [a regional investor] and a German company who we had been dealing
with for a couple years and we  could trust them, but they had a ﬁnancial
problem and from one day to another they said they cannot do it anymore. One
and  1/2 years later, [regional investor] decided that they wanted to invest . . . the
investment [from the regional investor] was  D 750,000 million . . .”
–
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NL-AIK (1997) “. . . [initial company] was ﬁnanced by two  private persons and the university . . .
grants from the government. And [we] generated revenue, small, . . . and the
initial money of the founders. . . .”
“In 2002 VC came in . . . one from the Netherlands and one from the UK. [We
moved for regional investment] because we needed more money in 2004. At the
end of 2004 we  had a second ﬁnancing round, with the same VCs and [regional
investor].”
2002
NL-RUC (1992) “I did my own due diligence by ﬁnding out who  were the best VCs in the
industry. I used peers for that . . .That was  the seed. Then we established a
consortium of VCs and then we  did another round with those VCs and then we
did  the mezzanine. In total four, including the seed. . . . [and] licensing income
from licensing this platform technology . . .”
“.  . . we had maybe a couple of million euros. Most of it, licensing income from
licensing this platform technology that we had generated to actually
manufacture the gene therapy products. [In 2000 we went public.]”
1996
NL-MPA (2000) “Our ﬁrst funds were my private funds, the second funds came from a very early
deal. And the third source of funding was a private investor. . . revenue also
includes license money and everything. It is non-equity related income, services
.  . . so what is happening now a bigger part of the revenue is becoming product
sales and services.”
2001
NL-EPP (1999) “. . . the salaries of the group was paid for through 2001 by the university . . . The
money for [salaries] was funded by one of the investors and the other 1/2 was
earned by ourselves by serving services and products to other companies and
laboratories.”
“.  . . gradually we  started to pay our own  salaries - that could have been in
2002.  . . [We  found] a major investor who attracted a number of other ones and
ended up in a ﬁnancial round at the beginning of this year which was sufﬁcient
to  carry us over.”
2005
UK-SXD (2000) “Raising the cash was  hard, pretty hard. We had never done it before, had a lot of
conﬂicting advice. We made it up ourselves as we went along . . .”
“We  got funding in the June 2001 and our ﬁrst contract was  by Christmas 2001.
.  . . then the following summer we did our ﬁrst licensing deal which was  a large
one. Stuff kicked off fairly quickly; we  kind of opened for business in October
2001 and shortly thereafter we got our ﬁrst [service for fee] contract.”
2001
UK-SPE (2001) “We didn’t need any seed investment. We could cover the cost of our rent from
the revenue we  were getting and paid the salaries. . . we set up the R&D division
and  at about that time we had a few small angel investors . . . they invested
about 800,000 pounds, largely to sustain the R&D division . . .”
“We  started in January of 2001 with 4 or 5 staff and we had a revenue stream
from the start’ . . . in June last year [2005] we had our ﬁrst fund raising exercise.”
2005
UK-NGP (2001) “The ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing was  about 175,000 pounds. . .We  tried [to ﬁnd VC
funding]. . . . in 2002 when we got the ﬁrst round of funding, we spent money on
a  guy to look for signiﬁcant venture funding to give the business a leg up. We
tried, we  failed, we really don’t want to go down that route again.”
“We’d rather grow the company organically . . . We only have to make 3 or 4
sales and we can double our turnover year on year very easily . . . I think VC is
less  relevant for us now.”
–
NL-TOC (1995) “In our case [in the beginning], VCs were not interested and the banks were not
interested. Nobody was interested in it so in the end it was personal capital that
went into it and a loan from the bank. That was  because we had two contracts in
our hands.”
“So we ﬁrst came with contracts and then we  got the loan. . .The ﬁrst VC was in
2002. We  had two  rounds and now [2006] it’s the ﬂoating.”
2002
NL-RIV (2002) “No investors. Something like D 50,000 to set it up [from founders personal
investment]. We  never applied for [government grant funding]. Everybody
worked for free. The deal was the moment we  can raise the money you get a
salary.”
“I  worked for free for 9 months. . . We started with 0 in the bank and we just did
it.  And nobody invested anything, just time and effort and then direct costs; that
is not serious. It’s not like you ask for a million VC money.”
–
UK-XHP (2002) “We  were trying to get funding in 2002 . . . and we  went down that road and
everybody had their hands permanently stuck in their pocket. Nobody wanted to
give out any money at all.  . . we  said well you know, let’s try to generate some
revenue ourselves. We put money in ourselves.”
“We  did get an investor behind us [in 2004] and that allowed us to get the
company up and running. We got the lab set up, bought some equipment, we
then got a grant from the DTI which helped get moving and extend the revenue
generation so it steadily increased from there.”
–
NL-OIB (2003) “. . . and of course generating revenues after a few months . . . we didn’t pay any
rent for the facility until [we] generated some revenue . . . The main things we
had  to pay were salaries and some people said, ok, don’t pay my salary for the
ﬁrst months. That makes it more easy to survive than if you have real employees
which are not shareholders which you have to pay every month. So in the
beginning we didn’t have a lot of money or no money and we said ok we  will
postpone [costs until] we  can pay.”
2008
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“Financing . . . was only the money from the university and the [regional
government] . . .We  applied for subsidies [salary tax deduction] and we also
got that. As of today [2006] we  always apply for that and we always get it
which is very important because it cuts down your salary costs tremendously
which helps us and still helps us . . .”
Grant-generation UK-GGF (1998) “The company was set up on 100,000 pounds. That was the original chunk of
money. That was raised from the European Union grants and put in by the
founders and associates. Following that there was a small round of seed
ﬁnance, which was really through high net worth individuals who invested in
the company at that stage. Contact through friends, . . .”
“The original money was grant and that lasted for 18 months, 2 years.
Subsequent to that there was a small round of money which lasted another 18
months to 2 years. And then we ran into some venture ﬁnance.”
2002
UK-XSS (2001) “We initially contacted about 100 VCs, went around and talked to a load of
them, presentations and all this kind of stuff, eventually, [charity
organizations] agreed to fund us. [Charity organizations] were the investors
that ended up backing this because it is a slightly longer term opportunity.
Therefore maybe the trust invests behind good science. If they make money
out of it, fantastic. If they have invested behind good science, that’s great and
they call it a grant. [The investor] has a long- term strategic interest in this
area of science. I suppose you could argue that they are more strategic
investors than your traditional VC fund.”
“[Charity organizations] gave us 1.4 million to start with and then about a year
ago  [2006] they gave us another million.”
2002
UK-XTG (1997) “Initially my  focus was on public funding, free money because I didn’t
understand capitalism in the beginning . . .”
“[We started selling products] in late 2001, early 2002. [Revenue since 2001]
grew steadily. The ﬁrst deals were the early adopters . . . we  grew up to about
400  K in 2006.”
2007
NL-ORP (2002) “We were able to attract a lot of grant money. That is our main source of
income. . . . it was D 350.000 [grant money]. With that I got another
[government] grant because they matched the money. Some small [investors]
came in.  . . then we were able to attract larger grants. I got a total of 6 grants
from [the government] and about 3 to 4 grants from patient organizations.
That amounts up to . . . six or seven million euros.”
“.  . . they came up with enough money to take us into the next step. . . . and so
late  last year I started looking for VC for now, for this particular phase and I
approached somewhat larger VC ﬁrms But now it is a little bit different
because we are in the clinic, we are a little bit bigger, new technology so that
they ﬁnd us now interesting and we have now some very good potential
investors coming on board.”
2007
NL-KLA (2005) “As you can see we  have no money. What we did is . . . I came here [university]
and  I work with this professor for more than 30 years. [the co-founder] . . . I try
to  get some money together to pay for some graduate students, which then
would be employed by [professor’s] department and paid by us. If that is
possible, I have a desk to sit at and use the facilities . . . I propose projects which
go  up for grants and if they are granted then I can stay for another few years.”
“We  have a network mainly in academia and by promoting enthusiasm we are
able  to do clinical trials at very low budget.”
–
NL-KYS (2004) “we  were successful at applying for the . . . grant. I became more and more
interested in the project and during the same time that we got the grant it was
decided that we would found a company based on this program, which was
also  one of the aims of the ﬁrst stage grant.”
“[Lab personnel are still employed at the university] that is part of the IP and
licensing deal that we have with the [university]. I don’t get paid for my
services and in exchange I have shares . . . At some point that will change and
then if people are involved they get paid. . . we  are at the point [that] it has to
be  funded by external sources.”
2007
NL-BRN (2003) “[The grant money in the beginning lasted] 3 years. The investors that we did
ﬁnd . . . came in through my co-founding partner. . . . not when we started but
later on . . .The ﬁrst round was 600,000 in total. It’s not that much. We had to
go  back for another round. That was August 2004. At the beginning of this year
January 2006 we did an additional round with the same investors.”
“We  founded the company as a legal entity in 2003. There was no reason to do
it  earlier. . . . once we got the investors in that was the ﬁrst time I was  on the
payroll of the company. Before that I was  paid on the grant from the
university.”
2007
i The ﬁrst round of fundraising is deﬁned as external ﬁnancing that is greater than £1 million, or D 1.5 million.
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Assisted
Investor-appointed UK-NEX (2002) “. . . a group of people came together at the same time and that is how things got
started.”
“. . . at the same time . . . we purchased the technology, we  actually transferred into
the new company some of those employees that had actually worked on that
technology . . .”
2002
UK-XOX (1999) “The CEO was  recruited with the help of recruitment agencies, headhunters and the
investor had a big role in that.”
“. . . the ﬁrst few months I was  given a room at the university until things were sort of
up  and going. [It took] probably three to four months to hire the CEO. . . The second
CEO  was an executive of a listed US based company with a lot of operational
experience in biotech in a closely related area. The third CEO diverse background at a
mid  size well established UK biotech. A few spells in VC areas, ﬁnancing. He started
beginning [of 2006].”
1999
UK-OVE (1998) “[The founders] were quite involved but they are both scientists and academics and
what the original founding shareholders wanted is someone who could run the
business.”
“[Investors] recruited our medical director who has basically been here since the
beginning . . . his background is big pharma. . .We  brought [CSO] on because we
wanted to kick start the research, And [another manager] as BD for licensing and
partnering. . . . I [CFO] joined in April 2004. I joined three months before the ﬂoat . . .”
1999
UK-XSS (2001) “[The co-founder] started working with me [academic founder] . . . and he quit his job
so  that he could do the fundraising full time. He left about a year ago [2005]. We are a
tiny  company.”
“[The second CEO] joined at funding when [the investors] put some money in and part
of  the conditions of money going in was  somebody like myself joining [the company].”
Ultimately I [2nd CEO] am responsible operationally as chief executive. We have our
CSO who  is full time and employed by the company . . . We have two people who  are
full time in the lab and we have an active on going collaboration with [academic
founder] . . . Our chairman is a physician and he has very hands involvement in any
clinical development because that is his area of expertise. In terms of drug discovery,
my  background is in biology systems and [the CSO] is a chemist. So you have the two
key  components of how you discover drugs basically.”
2006
NL-EPP (1999) “One of the ﬁrst investors brought [the executive management] in. He brought in
[business development] and he also brought in the previous CEO but that was  a bit of a
mistake. We  had quite a number of mistakes before we ended up with the
management team that we  have now.”
2003
NL-VAA (2000) “The founder/CEO left late 2002. Then we  had a CEO-less period and then a CEO and
then again a CEO-less period and then [the current CEO] in 2002. [CSO] is with us from
the start, 1999. [The business developer] joined in 2003 and [operations manager] in
2000, just after the founding. [The current CEO] was headhunted. He was in [large
chemicals ﬁrm]. I [business development manager] knew [the current CEO] before
hand and the other VP from a previous employer but that does not preclude that we
use  headhunters.”
2003
Founder-appointed UK-XCI (1998) “I wanted to hire [him] as CEO when we started but he couldn’t leave [CEO’s prior
employer] at the time. He came on board later. The CEO started in 2004 but he was the
chairman of the board since the founding. One of the clinical directors (regulatory)
was a good friend of the CEO. The other director (clinical manufacturing) is an old
friend [of the founder’s] who approached [the founder] for a job. The commercial
director was headhunted [2005].”
2000
UK-GGF (1998) “We  had two founding directors for at least 2 ½ years and they were supported by an
industry professional who worked for the company on an ad hoc basis. . . . about three
years in, we  hired a CEO who had commercial and ﬁnancial experience.”
“The ﬁrst two  employees were known to the founders, being experienced in the area
of the original research . . . one was from the University and one was from industry.
The next two employees were also from the university, people that were experienced
in  the particular skills that were required.”
2001
NL-HTP (2001) “[The CEO is the only founder, the sole founder.] We are a virtual, project management
organization. First he hired the secretary. . . . Then there was scientist from his
department at [prior employer], Then he hired a CFO via a headhunter. I [the chief
business ofﬁcer] heard that he left [our prior employer] . . . so I phoned him . . .”
2002
UK-PNI (1998) “The ﬁrst CEO had the antibacterial expertise and was  found through [university]
networks. He was  a part time CEO . . . in 2000, we  had a new CEO, a full time CEO. . . .
the  last CEO was  a sort of a jobbing CEO within the biotech sector. He was more of a
qualiﬁed CEO, from a public company. When we tried to appoint the last [3rd] CEO, the
ﬁnal one, [business development] was a key requirement. . .”
“[CSO] joined the company in 2000, just before I joined, we had a new CEO, a full time
CEO,  join as well. (The CFO) was recruited in Jan 2001 . . . to do the B round because
they weren’t having any success with it. I think at that point they had got a
management team that was  complete.”
2001
UK-KRA (1997) “I [academic founder] was  running the company and realized . . . I didn’t have the
commercial focus and understanding of a CEO. At that time I was doing some work as a
consultant for a drug company in Europe and their VP was  working with me  very
closely and we got along very well. . . . I said: would you be the CEO?”
1999
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UK-TRG (1998) “In the beginning, there was  basically two founders and the chairman came on board
at  that time. He’s still the chairman and CEO now. There was an original chairman in
the  early days who  stepped down or went elsewhere and then [the current one] came
on board, ex analyst and broker worked in the pharmaceutical industry, one of his
great strengths is that he has lots and lots of contacts in terms of raising ﬁnance.”
“I  [CFO] came on board in 1999 which is after we ﬂoated on OFX but before AIM, which
was  6 or 9 months later. End of 2000, [development director] came on board.”
2000
UK-SPE (2001) “. . . we have 30 people, probably 15 people have worked for me in my previous life.
With  my senior post doc who  had been with me  for about 10 years, we thought there
was  a business to be had providing that scientiﬁc know-how.”
“We  have a ﬁnance director. We have an executive chairman. And my  role until very
recently effectively a CEO and CSO. I provide scientiﬁc direction for the two divisions.
We  have two  managing directors that manage the two divisions [R&D and CRO
services]. We  have a research director who  manages [R&D] on a day-to-day basis . . .
we  have a managing director and a commercialization director for that division. The
[business development manager] started last September [2005].”
2005
NL-RUC (1992) “I’ve [recruited] very, very strong managers which is proven by the fact that those are
the  people who  are still running this large company. I recruited them when we were
still  a small company . . . I used headhunters for most of those people . . .”
“[First I hired] a business developer because I wanted to reinforce the business end of
the  company. [Then] the CFO, via a headhunter. Just prior to the acquisition and the
IPO, the general counsel whom we found through the network of the CFO.”
1996
NL-MPA (2000) “The ﬁrst [hires] were ex-colleagues, people who  were on the project. The ﬁrst person
I  hired was  the CFO. . . . my  2nd CFO was an introduction from [one of the investors].
Before [ﬁnancing] I think two or three people came on board . . . the VP Scientiﬁc
Applications, the inventor of the technology. . . . we  started with 7 people in January.
.  . . there was an ofﬁce manager and a few researchers. . .I  had a VP Biz Dev, starting in
2002 . . .”
2002
NL-ORP (2002) “Just me  [founder, CEO] at the founding. [The advisory board] had a lot of experience
in  the compounds . . . [and] . . . in starting up younger companies . . ..  . .we have a
research [head] coming in later this year [2007] . . . Then we have the development
group [head] and . . . a clinical director . . . we  have project managers and technical
project managers . . . There is one major project director . . . we have a lawyer . . . we
have a quality control . . . we  have a ﬁnancial CFO type, he is not on the payroll but I
am hiring him. He is too expensive for us right now but the new money comes in I
have to hire one of those types of guys.”
2007
Parent-appointed NL-PMA (2000) “I [1st CEO] ran a small venture capital fund. I was  approached by the Free University
[to  head up NL-MPA] because they had invented [technology] and patented their
invention.”
“Then 2nd CEO came along and he stayed there for a year and then the (3rd CEO) came
and he stayed for a year. The ﬁrst one was one of the founders. The second [CEO]
stepped down. The third one was  German but he was recruited away [poached] after
one year. He was  interim CEO who then turned into CMO. And then we have [the
current German CEO]. We had three Dutch and two  German [CEOs].”
2002
NL-LAG (1998) “We  [CEO of parent ﬁrm] recruited the guy to run the division who  would become the
CEO of that company. [The CEO] worked as [the head of the division in the parent ﬁrm]
for  a year and half working with us to spin it out.”
1999
UK-XTG (1997) “The [TTO] provided a managing director. They also provided a ﬁnancial director and a
part time project manager. . . . the CEO was a bad appointment and when we were
going through the last investment round . . . the leader of the group said we do want to
go  forward with this but we don’t want to have your current CEO. That was ﬁne by me;
if  they want to invest without him, then we’ll get rid of him. During the process of
things I met  the man  who  is the current CEO . . .”
“There were four when we were doing this work between 1996 and 1999 . . . By 2004 I
had seven in the lab . . .We  are on our 3rd CEO now.”
2000
UK-XOR (2004) “[University TTO partner] put one of their people in place to look after us, a guy, who
has  now gone off to run a [another biotech] company. . . . he sort of came in and
pushed us all around. There were some important steps to go through; the college . . .
had  a very limited history of spin outs . . .”
“[The interim CEO] was appointed in 2004 . . . and we started a number of research
programs. Then we  recruited a CEO . . .We  recruited another key member of the team,
who  had ﬁrst year drug development experience. I [academic founder] had the
research experience and he, who  I had known for a long time, had the drug
development experience . . . we  transferred over most of the long established staff [the
university lab employees].”
2004
UK-SAV (2003) “. . . I wanted to take some people who  were working with [university TTO partner]
and  use them as my management team. . . . they put in the full management team
until we went public. . .What we  actually did was take the CEO,. . .so we stole him. We
set  up in March and by August I persuaded this guy to come in and be the CEO.”
2003
NL-RIV (2002) “. . . the university asked me . . . can you structure this? They needed management;
they needed structure.”
“I’m the CEO, responsible for more business decisions, more strategic decisions. Most
of  the work is done by the deputy CEO. He is supported by a full time legal assistant
because we  have so much deal ﬂow and documents that we really needed a full time
legal  person. . . .”
2004
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Founders-diverse UK-RAS (2003) “We  were part of a big company, an American company. They shut down the UK site
.  . . we all worked in the same department at [prior employer] and we  all worked very
well together. [The CEO] was  our boss at [prior employer]. When we founded the
company, there were just the three of us.”
2003
UK-SXD (2000) “We  were working for [large pharmaceutical]. [The founder CEO] was in charge of R&D
at  [prior employer] and I [CSO] was in charge of, below him, the technology
development assessment. We’d become aware of a ﬁnance accountant [and] asked her
whether she was interested in joining. We three were the three founders and we put
our redundancy package into the funding. And then we  recruited the business
development director later in the year once the business was founded.”
2001
NL-TOC (1995) “We  knew each other for a long time . . . He [CEO] wanted to start his own business . . .
he  is an entrepreneur . . . [a] pharmacist, a scientist; he has his PhD and worked for an
American company in Amsterdam. [But] he also needed academic information, know
how and network . . . we sat together and we  worked out a plan.”
“I  stayed at the university but I got a number of hours to work at NL-TOC. [As academic
founder and CSO for a day a week] I didn’t do any management at any time. I tried to
help with sales acquisition in the beginning, provide scientiﬁc know-how, also at a
very operational level in the beginning.”
“There was no scientiﬁc director. Later [one was  hired to] lead the new technology
department. [That was] 4 or 5 years ago. [Up until that time the CEO was managing the
science and] there were project managers. It was a very ﬂat organization.”
2001
Unassisted
Founders-limited UK-YLP (2001) “I [academic founder] put in as much time now as I did before but, before when we
were directors and legally liable, we [academic founders] were more involved in
managing it. Now [the current CEO] is managing it. He basically came on as CEO [2006]
and we left the board. He was  hired by the [seed fund] as the entrepreneur in
residence. He is a part time CEO for [UK-YLP] and he is also part time CEO for two
other companies.”
2006
NL-AREK
(1990)
“My  co-founder and I were head of experimental pathology department at the
Academic Medical Center in Amsterdam. One of the demands of the business angel
was we  should stop every other job and be 100% dedicated to NL-AREK.”
“Until 2001, he was CEO and then we  had a management change and he was until
2003 scientiﬁc ofﬁcer and then he left the company. He disagreed with the strategy
that  we developed between 2000 and 2003.”
–
NL-KLA (2005) “We are with 3 or 4 co-founders in which the content part is by this university
professor and myself and the ﬁnancial part is by the other one. . . [the professor] is
writing some of the proposals that we  want to submit to get grants. He is guiding the
students [the two  at the university]. We  are, let’s say, the scientiﬁc heart of the
company.”
“We  have [in the university] two  people who are involved [in doing clinical trials] and
we  have a CRO. . . . we  attracted a part time CEO . . . he is now involved since Feb
[2007] in this company. Because we think it is not yet necessary to have full heads,
ﬁnancial or CEO functions at this moment.”
2007
NL-QIP
(original ﬁrm
1992;
re-established
in 1999)
“I [current CEO] started to work for [the seed fund that invested in NL-QIP] and . . . the
guy that should have run the company and the company didn’t really match . . .”
“There were only 2 people working there. . .I  [current CEO] started working there part
time. . . . in 93 . . . in 1996 started to work there full time . . .”
1996
NL-AIK (1997) “The [current] CEO started in 2004 . . . she started as a business developer for the ﬁrst
year . . . and at that time the [2nd] CEO left the company. He was  CEO for a few, two or
three, years.”
Preceding the 2nd CEO, the founders formed the management team from 1997 to 2001.
2002
UK-XHP (2002) “I [founder, CEO] met  a colleague [co-founder] at [prior employer]. My  [co-founder] is
working as the managing director so there is a role for a CSO but for the moment he is
covering that one. . .Three PhDs in the lab . . . analytical, in vitro and in vivo and each
of  those has one person in them.”
–
UK-NGP (2001) “There were three of us . . . one [co-founder] disappeared to some extent for the last
few years because he was  in Maryland . . .”
“.  . . the day-to-day running of the company and technical development is me
[co-founder, CEO].”
–
NL-KYS (2004) “. . . during the same time that we  got the grant it was  decided that we would found a
company We  have somebody who  is a technician who is doing the contract research
[in  the lab at the university]”
“. . . basically I [founder, CEO] was involved and am still involved as a CEO and there
were 5 additional scientists who became the founders and the university.”
2008
NL-BRN (2003) “I had someone helping me . . . I needed an external person next to me  to negotiate
with the university because I was  totally dependent on the university that gets the
grant money . . . when we  got to the point of spinning off the collaboration, we already
decided that we would continue to do it together and he would become a shareholder
and part of the management.”
“One of the other founders is the scientiﬁc head of the research program. [He is an]
academic partner . . . what we do with him is apply for research grants, academic
grants. Financing and business development is mostly by my partner.”
2010
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NL-OIB (2003) “At that time we started with 8 people who  were employed at another company,
myself and [a co-founder] were together the management of [prior employer] and we
asked people we already worked with to join us. The management team is me. . . . but
to  other companies and to VCs it is important to have somebody who  can call
themselves a CSO. [Another founder] is not really employed here but he is still
involved.”
“In  the relocation we lost 2 employees and founders because the travel was too far,
 only
–
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